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ABSTRACT 
 Hugh Lafollette’s theoretical justification of parental licensing hinges upon consideration of the 
harms associated with raising children. If we understand Lafollette’s stance as one in which the moral 
status of children is equal to that of other human beings, we must consider what such a commitment 
might require of social institutions such as the family. Unlike other licensing programs, I argue that 
Lafollette’s parental licensing program serves as a tool by which fair equality of opportunity can be 
acquired for those living within a given society. I attempt to demonstrate how the normative views as to 
the sovereignty of parents serve to discount the moral status of children, thus limiting the protections 
offered against child maltreatment. I will show how Lafollette’s theoretical justifications align with 
concerns addressed in John Stuart Mill’s harm principle and  Rawlsian views as to the importance of 
access to fair equality of opportunity.  
 
INDEX WORDS:  Lafollette, Children, Licensing, Parenting, Equal Opportunity,  
     Child Maltreatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE CERBERUS: PARENTAL LICENSING AND THE EQUALIZATION OF OPPORTUNITY 
 
An Honors Thesis 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for Graduation with 
Undergraduate Research Honors  
Georgia State University  
2015 
By 
Sidney Madison Prescott 
 
Committee 
_______________________________________________ 
Dr. Andrew I. Cohen, Honors Thesis Director 
 
________________________________________________ 
Dr. Sarah Cook, Honors Associate Dean 
 
     ________________________________ 
Date 
             
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Sidney Madison Prescott 
2015 
 
 
THE CERBERUS: PARENTAL LICENSING AND THE EQUALIZATION OF OPPORTUNITY 
 
by 
 
SIDNEY MADISON PRESCOTT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
      Honors Thesis Director:  Dr. Andrew I. Cohen 
      Honors College Associate Dean: Dr. Sarah Cook 
 
 
Electronic Version Approved: 
GSU Honors College 
Georgia State University 
April 2015
iv 
 
 “It takes more courage to examine the dark corners of your own soul than it does for a soldier to fight on 
a battlefield.”-William Butler Yeats 
There comes a time in each individual’s life where they must reflect upon the events of the past. 
And during the contemplation of the events of our lives, we make a decision. We decide to either defy the 
path once set before us or to allow that path to dictate the remaining years of our existence. Oftentimes 
the decision to change, to purposefully recreate oneself in order to pursue life with reckless abandonment 
comes at a price. We must forgo our previously held conceptions about ourselves, our world, and others 
in the hopes of attaining more assured footing within our futures.  
To understand the path which unfolds before us as a result of the birth lottery is difficult. Despair 
over the luck of it all can humble even the most stoic of individuals. But for those who have suffered at 
the hands of the individuals whom society entrusts with the responsibility of parenting, such questions 
remain forever unanswered. Could life have been different without the pain inflicted from those whose 
actions culminated in the creation of a life in one instance, and the hindrance of potential in another? The 
victims of child abuse and neglect are undoubtedly torn between the love society presupposes that a child 
has for their parents, and unmitigated bitterness for the fate suffered at the hands of their caregivers. In the 
path towards redemption, it always darkest before the dawn.  
There are five brave individuals who once endured horrific injustices in silence. Those same five 
individuals refrain from mentioning that which remains concealed under the guise of unity. But the unity 
which results from that which is unjust is the very essence of cruelty itself. Justice calls for unmitigated 
gall. Justice calls for bitter truths to be unearthed and revealed to all those still chained inside the cave, 
justice calls for the courage of conviction even in the face of harsh realities. For the one that could no 
longer endure the pain of the path which unfolded before him, I dedicate the passion contained within 
these pages to you. For the one who stoically believes that good can be found within those whose actions 
remained bathed in the darkness, I dedicate the hope contained within these pages to you. For the one who 
wishes to simply wipe the slate of human emotions clean in order to mitigate the pain emanating from the 
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memories of childhood, I dedicate the desire to equalize the beginning of life for all individuals contained 
within these pages to you. For the one who suffers in silence through the external recreation of the 
negative energy contained within her experiences, I dedicate the stoic commitment to equalize the moral 
standing of both children and parents contained within these pages to you. And for the little girl who 
gazed out of an open window each night from underneath an old pair of tortoise shell glasses, 
contemplating what life could be in spite of her circumstances… 
I dedicate the audacity contained within these pages to you.  
Although time has moved on, the five remain forever untied in the atrocities of the past. Millions 
of children remain trapped in a prison they cannot see, the result of a tragically abusive childhood. Sadly, 
many become victims of their own perceptions of life, unable to escape the mental and physical scars of 
child abuse and lose the will to continue on with their lives. To those who grew weary of the battle 
against themselves and the devastating memories of a childhood lost to the trauma of a broken home, I 
dedicate the empathy contained within these pages. May every individual who has ever felt neglected, 
wronged, changed, intimidated, ashamed, and afraid as a result of their upbringing find solace in their 
own desire to persevere through the madness in the hopes of forever changing their stars. 
In conclusion, I am reminded of Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. Individuals who grow up in chained 
within the cave must cling to hope with everything they have. According to the allegory, one individual 
will eventually break free to experience what lies beyond the cave. I believe that the potential to break 
free and bask in the light always exists for those who are willing to risk losing everything they believed to 
be true, in order to gain that which is beyond their wildest dreams. Thus, I dedicate my work to every 
single individual who dares to shrug off the darkness of the past in order to pursue the light with reckless 
abandonment. No matter how dark the night, never ever forget the brilliance of the dawn.  
Q.E.D. 
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“The sole end for which mankind are warranted individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action 
of any of their number is self-protection…the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.” 
–John Stuart Mill On Liberty1 
I. Introduction: Parental Licensing 
In Hugh Lafollette’s essay Licensing Parents, Lafollette argues for the state licensure of all 
parents (LP 182).2 Lafollette’s theoretical proposal for parental licensing centers on the components of 
raising children that mirror those of activities requiring state licensure (LP 184). In this thesis, I will 
defend several claims. First, I will argue that Lafollette grounds the theoretical justification of parental 
licensing on the prevention of harms to children (LP 184). Lafollette’s justification for interference in the 
family unit is firmly rooted in one of the normative principles of toleration (T 9).3 Thus, Lafollette’s 
parental licensing scheme is less of a radical ideology and more of an extension of one particular form of 
interference (T 81). I will show that Lafollette’s concerns are rooted in a desire to protect the moral status 
of children, as the justification of parental licensing is predicated on a belief that the moral status of 
children equals that of adults (LP 196). Next, I will argue that the current model of parenting presents 
serious challenges to the pursuit of equal opportunity within society that occurs as a result of the 
inequalities that persist within the family (PLC 272).4 I will demonstrate that a carefully planned and 
                                                          
1 I would like to credit Dr. Andrew J. Cohen’s book entitled Toleration with the inspiration for the use of the opening quote 
contained in this essay (Cambridge: Polity, 2014). 
 
2 Hugh Lafollette’s texts will be abbreviated as follows: LP refers to Licensing Parents (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1980); LPR 
refers to Licensing Parents Revisited (New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). 
 
3 Moving forward Cohen’s text will be abbreviated to as follows: T refers to Toleration (Cambridge: Polity, 2014). 
 
4 Ron Mallen’s essay will be cited as follows: PLC refers to Political Liberalism, Cultural Membership, and the Family  
(Florida: Social Theory and Practice, 1999).Within the context of this thesis, I will continually use the United States of America 
as the structural model of a civilized society. Although differences will occur within families as a result of the various dynamics 
contained within the internal structures of different societies (based on economic growth, access to natural and man-made 
resources, and civil unrest due to violent conflicts such as war), I believe that using the United States as a model will create a 
foundation by which to consider the theoretical implications of parental licensing (LP 182-197). Thus, the United States will 
serve as the model society within the consideration of Lafollette’s theoretical parental licensing proposal throughout my 
philosophical inquiry (LP 182-197).   
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executed parental licensing program is a morally justifiable way to support the equalization of opportunity 
within society (LP 182-197).  
Lafollette’s line of reasoning on the topic of parenting is a serious affront to the normative 
manner in which society treats the activity of raising children (LP 182-197). Despite Lafollette’s 
departure from the typical way in which individuals come to raise children, the claims brought against 
Lafollette’s theoretical proposal do not adequately address the issue of maltreatment of children within 
the normative parental model which consistently defers to parental sovereignty (LP 186).5 Finally, I will 
argue that the benefits of parental licensing remain viable outside of Lafollette’s theoretical framework, 
and I will demonstrate said claim by briefly outlining a mockup of a parental licensing program  
(LP 182).6  
II. Exploring the Conditions: Theoretical Justifications for Licensing Programs 
Lafollette’s support of a theoretical parental licensing program begins with a consideration of the 
components of parenting that mirror those of activities currently requiring licensure (LP 181). Our society 
typically regulates activities that are deemed to contain certain elements of risk for either the individual 
involved in said action or others (LP 182-183). The regulation of said activities exists via state 
intervention and regulatory agencies maintained through professional associations that are responsible for       
overseeing entrance within certain occupations (LPR 328).7 Furthermore, the theoretical justifications for 
the licensing of certain activities can be seen in current United States law that stipulates;8 
                                                          
5 The working definition of the normative parenting model will include single-parent and two-parent homes, and refers to the 
lack of public interference within the typical household routines involving the rearing of children (LP 340). 
 
6 The proposed parental licensing scheme will be introduced to offer tangible support for the drafting of a public policy instituting 
a parental licensing program (LPR 338-340). Due to the constraints of the thesis project, I will only provide an overview of the 
primary components of a parental licensing program (LPR 338-340). Future academic projects will address the continuation of 
the drafting of public policy aimed at instituting a parental license program (LPR 338-340). 
 
7 The authority of the state to regulate potentially harmful activities will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections (LP 182). 
For the time being, I will take the position whereby individuals living within society can be said to give their consent to the state 
(and certain professional associations) to uphold certain standards and practices that are commonly associated with the regulatory 
powers necessary to approve and deny licenses for a variety of activities (LPR 328). 
 
8 Moving forward, I will deem the arguments that negate the validity of the laws as set forth in U.S. legislation invalid (LP 328). 
Within the context of the discussion at hand, we can assume citizens will execute compliance with the normative structure of the 
United States government and laws emanating from said government (LP 328).  
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When practice of a profession or calling requires special knowledge or skill and intimately affects 
public health, morals, order or safety, or general welfare, legislature may prescribe reasonable 
qualifications for persons desiring to pursue such professions or calling and require them to 
demonstrate possession of such qualifications by examination on subjects with which such profession 
or calling has to deal as a condition precedent to right to follow that profession or calling (LPR 328). 
Thus, Lafollette identifies two conditions contained in the law that account for the theoretical justification 
of licensing activities:  
1. Individuals are to be engaged in an activity that may pose a direct or indirect harm to others. In 
addition, the harm may be categorized as “significant and life-altering” (LPR 328).  
2. Individuals can only perform the potentially harmful activity if they possess a certain level of 
competence   (LPR 328).  
Moving forward, I will explore the problems Lafollette has associated with the aforementioned 
conditions and the manner in which the author addresses the solutions needed to solidify the conditions 
that are not only necessary, but sufficient for the theoretical licensing of an activity (LPR 328).  
Lafollette deems the previous conditions as necessary but insufficient in terms of justifications 
pertaining to the regulation of harmful activities through the enforcement of licensing (LPR 328). 
Lafollette argues for a third condition that he believes is necessary to both counteract theoretical 
opposition to a licensing program and simultaneously justify the institution of a licensing program  
(LPR 328). According to Lafollette, a licensing program is only theoretically justified if the benefits of 
the program outweigh the theoretical proposals aimed at refuting the regulation of the action in question 
(LPR 328). Therefore, in order for any licensing program to gain theoretical justification, all three 
conditions must be met (LPR 328). Lafollette is quick to note that the need for all of the conditions does 
not negate the strength of each condition in and of itself (LPR 328). Rather, the trifecta of conditions 
allows for a substantial justification of licensing (LPR 328). Next, I will detail the specific components of 
each of the conditions deemed both necessary and sufficient for the theoretical justification of a licensing 
program in Lafollette’s view (LPR 328).  
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First, Lafollette sets out the condition known as “actions risky to others,” described as the type of 
activities some individuals may engage in which pose regular risks to non-participants (LPR 329). 
Lafollette describes the act of driving an automobile as one which poses a routine risk to others (LP 183). 
Lafollette points out the potential harms posed by the operation of a vehicle, thus indicating that the act of 
driving serves to signify as one example of the type of risky action one might regulate through a licensure 
program (LP 183).9 Lafollette acknowledges the need to avoid the censorship of activities merely because 
they pose a potential threat to others (LP183). Rather, Lafollette notes that normative regulatory licensing 
programs aim for a trade-off of sorts, in order to maintain the autonomy of both the individual engaging 
in the potentially risky activity and those who are merely innocent bystanders (LP 183).10  
Driving regulations require individuals to exhibit a certain level of competency in order to limit the 
harms that arise from the risky activity (LP 183). Requiring that those who wish to drive to demonstrate a 
certain level of competence thus limits the potential harms without negating the benefits the individual 
receives as a result of participating in the activity (LP 183). Following Lafollette’s line of reasoning leads 
one from denoting the actions deemed as potentially harmful to others to understanding the stipulations 
necessary to justify participation in said action (LPR 329). Moving forward, I will review the second 
condition that Lafollette deems necessary to justify the restrictions contained within licensing programs  
(LPR 329). 
The next condition Lafollette indicates to be necessary within the justification of licensing schemes 
comes in the form of requiring certain levels of competency from those who wish to participate in 
                                                          
9 In Licensing Parents, Lafollette refers to the action of driving an automobile as that which causes potential risks to others 
 (LP 183). However, in Licensing Parents Revisited, Lafollette primarily describes those acts performed by professionals, such as 
physicians or lawyers as befitting the regulations imposed by licensing programs (LPR 329). This distinction will be discussed in 
subsequent sections of this project (LP, LPR). It is important to note that the similarities of both types of action are a result of the 
potential harms posed to others by those who choose to operate a motor vehicle (LP 183).  
 
10 Lafollette’s examples of normative licensing programs reference those used to regulate automobile drivers, as well as those 
used to control medical and legal professionals within their respective fields (LPR 329). In subsequent sections of this body of 
work, I will discuss my views on the important distinctions to be made between the various types of licensing, particularly in 
reference to licensing of parents (LP 183-197).  
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activities deemed risky to others (LPR 329). On Lafollette’s view activities that pose potential risks to 
others require the demonstration of certain levels of competency before one engages in said activity  
(LP 183). If it is reasonable to subject risky actions to some measure of regulations, Lafollette also 
reasons it to be theoretically desirable to regulate actions via the implementation of a licensing program 
(LP 183). Furthermore, if a reliable procedure can be created to assist in determining the competency of 
those who wish to participate in risky activities, Lafollette argues that the action must be regulated  
(LP 183). Therefore, Lafollette claims that establishing licensing procedures “is the most feasible way of 
protecting vulnerable citizens” (LP 183).  
In addition, Lafollette believes that the relationship between individual parties also raises the risks 
associated with certain actions (LPR 329). Activities such as practicing medicine or the law are two 
examples of professions whereby particular relationships are established between the practitioner and the 
client (LPR 329). Lafollette argues that individuals who demonstrate incompetence pose a greater risk of 
harm to innocent individuals (LPR 329). Competency on Lafollette’s view contains four different 
components, “knowledge, abilities, judgment, and disposition” (LPR 329). On Lafollette’s view, an 
individual must possess some knowledge in order to demonstrate the competency needed to partake in 
risky activities (LPR 329). Thus, individuals must be acquainted with the basic facts necessary to 
participate in risky actions (LPR 329). Lafollette offers examples of the knowledge physicians, and 
attorneys maintain respective of their professions (LPR 329). Both doctors and lawyers cannot adequately 
perform the tasks assigned to their roles as professionals without obtaining a solid knowledge base to aid 
their efforts (LPR 329).                                                                                                                                             
Next, Lafollette addresses the second component of competency; the ‘abilities’ professionals possess 
in addition to their foundation of knowledge (LPR 329).11 The possession of certain skills bolsters the 
knowledge one holds on a particular subject matter, thus creating a greater level of competency within the 
individual (LPR 329). Arguably, we may not know the specific abilities an individual should possess to 
                                                          
11 During the discussion surrounding the different components of competency, Lafollette uses the term ‘ability’ and the word 
‘skill’ interchangeably (LPR 329). 
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partake in risky activities (LPR 329). However, Lafollette believes the mere possession of “considerable 
abilities” is an essential component within the discussion of licensing hazardous activities (LPR 329). 
Lafollette uses the example of the reading and writing skills lawyers must possess in order to demonstrate 
the type of abilities that are important within the discussion of individual competency (LPR 329). 
Lafollette moves the discussion forward, introducing the third component of competency, personal 
judgment (LPR 329). Lafollette argues that a lack of judgment during the decision-making process can 
jeopardize those who may come into contact with professionals (LPR 329-330). Those who participate in 
actions deemed risky to others must possess the judgment needed to conduct a proper assessment of the 
various situations that arise during certain activities (LPR 330).  Activities such as the diagnosis of 
medical conditions or the methodology behind the advancement of particular distinctions within a legal 
case are two examples of the types of risky activities in which a certain level of judgment is needed  
(LPR 330).  Lafollette concedes that one may not know the extent of the judgment necessary to 
adequately pursue risky activities (LPR 330).  However, Lafollette believes that we can still understand 
the negative ramifications defective judgment has upon innocent people (LPR 330).   
The ‘disposition’ of the individual is the final component of competency Lafollette advocates for in 
regards to the safe and efficient execution of dangerous activities (LPR 330). On Lafollette’s view, an 
individual may possess the knowledge, skills, and judgment necessary to participate in risky activities and 
still lack the ability to perform certain tasks in a competent manner (LPR 330).  Certain dispositions may 
limit the scope of the various components of competency, thus impeding the individual’s ability to 
perform some actions without amplifying the risks to others (LPR 330).  Again, Lafollette acknowledges 
the difficulty contained within the assessment of which particular dispositions might impede an 
individual’s competency (LPR 330).  However, on Lafollette’s view one can still agree that the 
possession (or lack thereof) of certain dispositions amplifies the likelihood that the individual will not 
execute her tasks in a competent manner (LPR 330). Moving forward, I will explore the final component 
of Lafollette’s argument in support of licensure programs (LPR 330). 
7 
 
 The last condition which justifies Lafollette’s theoretical reasons for the institution of licensure 
programs is the examination of the theoretical costs and benefits associated with the regulations contained 
within licensure programs (“LPR 330). Although licensure programs can be justified in order to regulate 
activities that might pose significant harms to others and ensure competency within those who wish to 
perform risky activities, Lafollette believes a third condition is needed (LPR 328).  The two conditions 
previously discussed fail to adequately address the theoretical reasons for licensure programs, thus 
proponents of licensing must demonstrate the ways in which the benefits of licensing might outweigh the 
costs associated with the regulatory action (LPR 329).  Lafollette argues that all licensing programs poses 
significant limitations to an individual’s options and can also become costly to maintain within society 
(LPR 328). Thus, in order to theoretically justify licensure programs one must illustrate “good reasons for 
licensing an activity” (LPR 330).12   
Lafollette also notes the importance of moderation in the composition of the standards used to 
license individuals within a given society (LPR 330).13 Programs which contain unreasonable 
expectations from individuals wishing to become licensed for a particular activity will reject a large 
number of qualified candidates; while those programs with insufficient criteria will allow incompetent 
individuals the ability to become licensed (LPR 330). Thus, the theoretical justification of licensure 
programs must ensure that innocent individuals are safeguarded against risk without posing 
insurmountable costs to others (LPR 330).  
Lafollette disregards the speculations of those who believe the costs of licensure programs are too 
high to tolerate any form of licensing (LPR 330). On Lafollette’s view, licensing is justified in order to 
limit those who may pose a significant risk to others from participating in certain activities (LPR 330). 
                                                          
12 In subsequent sections, I will explore a multitude of reasons Lafollette might deem to be acceptable for the licensing of certain 
activities within society (LP 182-197).  
 
13 Lafollette gives examples of what type of guidelines one might follow to ensure a moderate licensure program in regards to 
parenting (LPR 327-341). I will examine the positive and negative aspects of embracing moderation within the creation of 
licensure programs throughout this thesis (LP 182-197). 
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The costs associated with a complete disregard for any proposed form of licensure is insurmountable 
compared to the risks associated with imposing some regulations on particularly risky activities  
(LPR 330). I have examined the criteria Lafollette considers to be necessary for the theoretical 
justification of licensing programs (LP 182-197). Next, I will examine the components of activities 
deemed to pose potential risks to others, in order to further deconstruct Lafollette’s argument that offers a 
look at the justification of licensing certain activities (LPR 328-331). 
 
III. The Harm Principle: Understanding the Justification of Interference 
 On a daily basis, individuals in our society make the choice to engage in certain activities, some 
of which pose a significant risk to the well-being of other individuals (LP 183). Although we respect the 
decision-making abilities of rational adults, our society imposes a fair amount of limitations upon certain 
activities (LP 182). The regulation of explicit activities is predicated upon the belief that said activities are 
deemed as potentially harmful to others (LP 183). The distinction between the harm an activity might 
pose to the individual, as opposed to the harm an activity might pose to others is critical as the discussion 
moves forward (T 62). Lafollette’s argument leans heavily on the distinction between the actions that 
pose harms to others, as opposed to those actions that might harm the individual participating in the 
activity (LPR 328). On Lafollette’s view, the “theoretical rationale” behind the licensing of certain actions 
begins with one of two conditions, the first of which pertains to the harms which may befall others as a 
result of an individual’s participation in an activity (LPR 328).14 I would argue that Lafollette’s argument 
first requires an understanding and assessment of how one might define “harm” (LP 182-197). Next, I 
will argue that an understanding of the various dynamics contained within the concept of “harm” is 
necessary for the theoretical justification of any licensing program (LP 182).  
                                                          
14 The individual in question must not have any coercive elements stimulating their participation in a particular action deemed to 
expose others to potential harms (T 49). I would argue that if an individual is coerced to participate in activities that pose a risk of 
harm to others, the theoretical conditions for licensing would become null and void, as the individual is not engaging in the 
activity of their own volition (T 49). 
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Although Lafollette goes to great lengths to pinpoint the skills which he believes individuals 
should possess in order to limit harm to others, he does not approach the topic of how one might define 
what might constitute “harm” (LPR 328). However, I believe that the dissection of Lafollette’s theoretical 
justification of parental licensing necessitates an understanding of what constitutes “harm” (LPR 328). A 
very salient approach to this subject matter is explored within Andrew J. Cohen’s work entitled 
Toleration, which details the importance of the various distinctions between “harm” and the “harm 
principle” (T 38-49). In line with Cohen’s view, the remainder of the argumentation in support of 
Lafollette’s theoretical conditions for licensing will focus on the objective nature of harms (T 40-46). 
Therefore, objections as to what types of actions might constitute harms can be examined without any 
negative repercussions to the justifications of licensing posed by Lafollette (LPR 331). I would argue that 
an objective approach to harm allows for one to assess the moral justification of a parental licensing 
program, particularly in terms of the licensures ability to negate potential harms towards children  
(LP 182-192).  
Defining the criteria for harm through the introduction of “normative principles of toleration” 
assists the members of society to understand the moral justifications for interference (T 36-40). Taking a 
rational and objective approach towards the justification of interference in the actions of others is 
necessary in order to avoid the pitfalls of selective explanations for interference in the lives of others 
(T 40-46). If we take personal autonomy to be of significance in the continuation of a liberal society, we 
must maintain a structured and rational approach towards the justification of interference in the lives of 
other individuals (T 46). The members of our society undoubtedly wish to lead lives whereby relentless 
interference in every aspect of their decision-making is not the standard modus operandi (T 46). Allowing 
for interference is thus justifiable, provided the interference remains devoid of any arbitrary 
considerations as to why one might restrict the actions of others (T 40-46). Finding normative principles 
to guide us as to when we might justify interfering with others allows us to respect the autonomy of all 
individuals, whether they be actively participating in certain acts or mere bystanders (T 46). 
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The definition of “harm” throughout this thesis will be defined as a “wrongful setback of 
interests” (T 40).15 Within the defense of Lafollette’s argument, I will explore the application of the harm 
principle as it applies to the theoretical justification of parental licensing (LP 183). Although multiple 
variations of the harm principle exist, I will primarily focus on the strict version of the harm principle 
with a slight alteration, henceforth to be referred to as the praesumptio harm principle defined as follows: 
“Actions involving the wrongful setback of a child’s (non-rational agent) interest in not being abused or 
neglected when committed by a rational individual result in a failure to meet one’s parental obligations 
to children, and thus interference is warranted” (T 119).16 The praesumptio harm principle serves to 
establish a normative principle of toleration that contains guidelines for how one might address actions 
involving individuals who are unable to engage in consensual acts due to the developmental restrictions 
on their ability to reason (T 114). By addressing the interactions that take place between rational and non-
rational agents, the praesumptio harm principle provides an additional component to advance the harm 
principle’s effectiveness in matters involving rational individuals and those individuals whose rationality 
is still in the developmental phase (T 48).  
The praesumptio harm principle also modifies the “strict version” of the harm principle by 
altering the required completion of a wrongful setback of interests before said interference is justified  
(T 39). Mill uses the words “only” and “sole” to describe when interference with another is morally 
justified (T 39). However, I would argue that if we can find an objective method by which to prove that 
individual actions will bring about a wrongful setback of interests we can prohibit the activity in question 
before the act actually takes place (T 49). First, we must ascertain how one might go about developing a 
principled way to interfere with the actions of others based only on the statistical likelihood that harms 
might occur (T 119). Initially, the limitation of future acts appears to be quite problematic 
                                                          
15 The concept of a “wrongful setback of interests” originates from John Stuart Mill concept of the harm principle, which pertains 
to a principled approach to toleration within a society (T 38-39). 
16 The praesumptio harm principle was crafted as a response to my ongoing advocacy for preventative intervention within the 
discussion of harms committed against others. It is inspired by Cohen’s proposal of a “principle of parental responsibility” that 
addresses the obligation parents have to satisfy in order to avoid any sorts of interference in the rearing of children (T 119).  
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(T 117). After all, to interfere with an action that has not yet occurred based solely on the statistical 
likelihood of an occurrence faces serious barriers in terms of the justification of the interference (T 118).  
However, as Lafollette demonstrates, this particular method of interference is currently the basis 
of licensure programs deemed justifiable by our society (LPR 335). Lafollette argues that  “licensing 
programs are future-directed in both aim and execution” (LPR 335). The manner by which we limit 
participation in certain actions through licensing practices demonstrates the practicality of restricting 
actions that may potentially pose harms to others (LPR 335). Thus, the praesumptio harm principle falls 
directly in line with the justifications currently used within the execution of licensing programs  
(LP 182-183). As such, I would argue that Lafollette’s justification of a theoretical parental licensing 
program aimed at future acts of parenting works in unison with the praesumptio harm principle  
(LP 184-186). 
Our society requires that any individual who desires to operate a motor vehicle must demonstrate 
certain levels of proficiency and competency before they are issued a driver’s license (LP 183). The same 
can be said for the criteria currently in place within various professions such as medicine and the practice 
of the law (LP 183). Individuals are required to demonstrate certain capabilities in order to lower the 
potential risks posed to others as a result of certain actions (LP 183). Although the individual has not yet 
committed any particular harm, society deems it acceptable to interfere with the individual’s future 
actions because the acts in question hold significant statistical risks to the welfare of others (LP 183). This 
is an important distinction to make, as Lafollette’s theoretical parental licensing proposal hinges on 
interfering with unrestricted parenting before the act of parenting takes place (LP 184). As Lafollette 
states, “parenting is an activity potentially very harmful to children” (LP 184).17 Thus, according to the 
praesumptio harm principle, interference with the act of parenting is justified.  
One potential issue lies in the manipulation of the principle by those who wish to hinder the 
actions of others before the action in question takes place (T 46). Those who want to limit actions they 
                                                          
17 Subsequent chapters of the thesis will address the specific types of harms parenting poses to children (LP 184-185). 
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disagree with could just threaten to harm others, and it appears as if the praesumptio harm principle 
would justify interfering with the future action (T 46). However, I would argue that any delineation from 
the limitations set forth in the harm principle can be avoided through the careful assessment of an 
individual’s motivations (T 46). The interference justified by the harm principle exclusively pertains to 
the individual “doing or likely to do the harm” (T 46). Therefore, those who threaten harm in order to 
justify interference with the actions of others are simply in violation of the harm principle (T 46). 
The creation of normative principles such as the harm principle allows those living  in a given 
society to pinpoint which acts are morally questionable and thus subject to possible interference (T 37).18 
At this particular point in the discussion of interference, it is also important to note that the harm principle 
does not dictate the type of interference one might pursue (T 50-51). According to Cohen, the harm 
principle merely stipulates “when interference is warranted, it is silent about what sort of interference is 
permitted” (T 50).19 The question remains as to how one might objectively ascertain whether or not a 
“wrongful setback to interests” has occurred, thus justifying interference with the actions of others (T 40). 
Prima facie, it seems as if the manner by which we evaluate actions might risk becoming convoluted; as 
the evaluation of said acts may be subjective in nature (T 40-46). However, the disagreement as to what 
might constitute a wrong does not necessitate a departure from adherence to the harm principle (T 42).  
Arguably, there may be points of contention as to which actions are to be defined as wrongs 
pursuant to the restrictions set forth in the harm principle (T 45). However, such disagreement does not 
change the wrongfulness of the act in question and as we only need to abide by the following; should an 
act be considered as both wrong and the primary contribution to a setback of interests we are justified in 
interfering with the action (T 46).  According to the harm principle, if an act is not a wrongful act, it 
                                                          
18 The praesumptio harm principle is included in the assessment of normative principles of justice which in and of themselves 
can be seen as components of complete theories of justice (T 37-38). 
 
19 Subsequent chapters will discuss the types of interference that might be imposed upon those wishing to participate in the 
activity of parenting, including the regulation of those deemed capable of raising children and the criteria one might be expected 
to meet before obtaining a parental license (LPR 331-333). 
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cannot be considered as harm (T 40 ). If both components of the harm principle are not present, the 
consideration of the possible setback to interests is null and void, and interference is impermissible 
(T 40). Within the context of the topic of parental licensing, we will consider whether or not the abuse, 
neglect and maltreatment of a child constitutes a wrong, and, therefore, a potential setback to interests 
thus justifying interference with the action of parenting (LPR 335). 
The next component of the harm principle centers on how the completion of the wrongful act 
simultaneously leads to a setback to interests (T 40-42). In order to justify interference, the harm principle 
also requires that the wrongful action setback the interest of another individual (T 42). However, the 
difficulty lies in the assessment of what might constitute a setback to interests (T 43-44). Consider what 
we might think of a person who murders someone breaking into their home. The individual commits the 
act of murder out of fear that the burglar may cause destruction to both the individual’s physical well-
being and their property. Is the burglar’s interest in living “set back” by the homeowner’s act of self-
defense that leads to the burglar’s death?  On the one hand, the homeowner might have spared the life of 
the burglar through the use of less force during the protection of their property and life; on the other hand 
the burglar committed a wrongful act as she attempted to rob the homeowner. In addition, the 
homeowner’s interest in not having their property damaged and their physical well-being threatened was 
setback by the burglar’s actions. Arguably the burglar both wronged the homeowner and set back the 
homeowner’s interest in not being robbed.20 An account of how such actions are to be assessed can be 
found in John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government.21 
According to Locke, individuals who attempt criminal acts have renounced the reason we 
attribute to human beings, and can thus be treated in the same manner typically reserved for halting the 
violent behaviors of wild animals (STG 7). The violation of the “laws of nature” that restrict an individual 
from acting in the same manner as animals are predicated upon an individual’s capacity to reason  
                                                          
20 The example of the criminal breaking into a home is inspired from Cohen’s talk of difficult cases of harms (T 45). 
 
21 The John Locke manuscript entitled, Second Treatise of Government will be referred to as follows: STG  
(New York: Barnes and Noble Publishing, 2004).  
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(STG 7). Thus, actions executed by those who possess the faculties necessary to reason are expected to 
consist of a certain type of actions, primarily those activities that do not bring about harm (STG 7). If 
individuals who are otherwise considered to be rational engage in acts that subject other human beings to 
harm, Locke argues that one is justified in interfering with the actions of the offender so as to halt any 
harm from taking place (STG 7).  
In the previous example of the burglar and the homeowner, one can ascertain that the 
homeowner’s interest in not being harmed by another rational being trumps the burglar’s interest in not 
being killed during the attempted home invasion (STG 7).  However many cases are not as clear-cut as 
the burglary of a property, and thus require careful consideration in order to understand whether or not a 
setback to interests has indeed occurred (T 45-46). We may deem some cases remarkably simple to solve, 
such as the act of murdering another human being, as the individual’s interest in living is set back with the 
act of killing (T 45). However, many cases contain various instances where the committing of a wrong 
might setback multiple interests, including the individual who is considered to be in violation of the harm 
principle (T 46). 
The consideration of a narrowed view of those actions which might constitute harms allows one 
to assess the actions of one individual in juxtaposition with the well-being of other individuals who are 
not engaged in the act in question (T 48). As Cohen states, “If we adopt the harm principle as the sole 
normative principle of toleration, when two or more people act upon one another with full consent, their 
action must be tolerated” (T 48). However, within our society, activities take place amongst both adults 
and minors (T 48). Thus, the question remains as to how a society might address the implementation of 
the harm principle as it relates to adults whose actions impact those who cannot consent, children (T 48). 
Children are a particularly special case, as there are questions as to whether the debate should center on 
the child’s interests or the child’s status as a potential bearer of rights (CSF 1).22  
On the subject of children and the harm principle, John Stuart Mill argued,  
                                                          
22 David Archard’s text will be abbreviated as follows: CSF refers to Children, Family, and the State (England: Ashgate, 2003). 
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It is, perhaps hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in 
the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of children, or of young persons below the age 
that the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require 
being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as against 
external injury (T 48). 
 However, we must understand the manner in which Mill references children (T 48).  The 
statement clarifies the amount of responsibility children hold during the execution of wrongful acts 
against others and the protection deemed necessary to protect children from injuries resulting from the 
actions of mature individuals (T 48). Thus, Mill intended to imply there is a distinction between who 
might qualify as a rational actor in cases whereby one or more of the individuals in question is proved to 
be lacking the normative components of rationality (T 48). Moving forward, we must consider how acts 
executed by rational individuals against those deemed to be non-rational might be assessed within the 
parameters of the harm principle (T 48-49).  
The question remains as to how one might justify interference in cases in which the actions of 
consenting adults result in setting back the interests of those who cannot give their consent, namely 
children (T 111-124). Herein lays the next component of any critique of cases where setback to interests 
may exist. We must address simple cases of wrongful acts setback the interests of others, along with the 
more complicated and sometimes morally ambiguous cases as well (T 45). Two tools exist which can 
help us to ascertain whether or not an act constitutes a wrong (T 45). First, we can consider cases that 
model those in question; in order to compare and contrast the possible resolution to be reached as to 
whether or not the wrongful act also constitutes a potential setback to interests (T 45). A conclusion may 
result from the consideration of similar cases (T 45). Next, we can assess how the interference warranted 
by the harm principle might burden those justified to intervene if harms exist (T 46). If the interference 
justified by adherence to the harm principle contains a significant amount of burden, (i.e. death or 
dismemberment) for violators of the principle, those wishing to interfere hold a higher burden of proof 
during the disruption of the act (T 46). 
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 In essence, cases in which interference might hold severe and life altering consequences must 
meet a higher threshold of scrutiny including; the authentication of the accused individual’s participation 
in the act in question, verification of the wrongfulness of the action, and confirmation of a setback of the 
victim’s interests as a result of the act in question (T 46). A similar frame of reference can be seen in the 
legal system’s requirements for cases of possible discrimination against the government (T 46). The onus 
remains on the state to demonstrate a higher burden of proof when individuals believe that government 
actions create an undue burden on the individual (LP 192). Along the same vein, cases whereby 
interference produces serious consequences for the individual in question must be subjected to intense 
scrutiny to ensure that the act of interfering does not result in the creation of harms (T 75). The 
considerations mentioned above will be of use as we examine the level of interference parental licensing 
requires and consider whether or not the interference itself constitutes the wrongful setback of a parent’s 
interest in raising children (LP 185). 
 I have presented Lafollette’s considerations of current licensure programs and have found them 
to be consistent with the accounts contained within the harm principle (LP 182-186). The regulation of 
acts deemed to present risks of harm to others is justified, as it provides a method by which one can 
decrease the occurrence of harm (T 65). On Lafollette’s view, the licensing of parents is thus justified as 
the act of rearing children contains the same potential for harms as actions currently regulated through 
existing licensure programs (LP 184). Moving forward, I will present Lafollette’s argument that applies 
the same theoretical justifications for licensure programs to the activity of raising children (LP 182-197). 
IV. Parental Licensing: The Theoretical Justification of Interference within the Family 
                Initially, Lafollette’s arguments supporting licensing schemes are based on those professionals 
whose actions pose significant risks to innocent individuals (LPR 328).23 Lafollette uses this approach in 
order to first outline the theoretical justifications for licensure programs before applying the same 
                                                          
23 Lafollette’s examples predominantly center on the justification of licensure programs within the medical and legal professions 
(LPR 327). However, the author’s argument centers around utilizing the same conditions used to justify the licensing of 
physicians and lawyers to support the licensing of other risky activities (LP 184).   
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considerations to the possible regulation of parenting activities (LPR 331). On Lafollette’s view, the 
theoretical arguments for licensing risky activities gives rise to plausible justifications for the regulation 
of parenting (LPR 331). Lafollette outlines the similarities contained within the theoretical justification of 
licensure programs that regulate risky activities such as driving a motor vehicle or practicing medicine 
and the activity of raising children (LP 184-186). Next, Lafollette argues for the inclusion of parenting 
within the type of activities those in society believe the possession of a license is necessary (LP 185). In 
the next section, I will outline Lafollette’s comparisons between the theoretical justification of licensing 
risky activities and the theoretical justification of licensing parents (LPR 331-333).   
 Lafollette begins with a comparison between the vulnerability of children and others within 
society (LP 331). Children are susceptible to being harmed by their caregivers, just as patients are at risk 
of being hurt by their physicians (LPR 331). The risk of harm stems from the “special relationship” that 
exists between parents and their children (LP 331). Lafollette believes the primary components of this 
special relationship are a combination of the vulnerability of children, and the exclusive amount of control 
parents have over their children (LP 185). Lafollette deems the act of raising children to be risky, thus 
parenting meets the first condition of the theoretical justification of licensing (LPR 331). 
 Next, Lafollette addresses the costs associated with the potential harms children may incur at the 
hands of their caregivers during childhood (LPR 331). Lafollette offers further support for this claim with 
the introduction of a variety of statistics regarding cases of child abuse and neglect (LPR 331). According 
to the data, parents were the party responsible for nearly 80% of child maltreatment cases while their 
unmarried partners made up an additional 4% of maltreatment cases in the United States (LPR 331). In 
addition, there are approximately two million cases of substantiated child abuse and neglect cases each 
year across the country (LPR 331).24 Lafollette provides statistical data in conjunction with a thorough 
examination of the long-term implications of child abuse and neglect (LPR 331).  
                                                          
24 The statistical data contained within Licensing Parents Revisited is a product of the US Department of Health and Human 
Services Child Maltreatment Report containing an analysis of data collected nationwide pertaining to cases of child abuse and 
neglect as reported to child protective service agencies (LPR 341). Arguably the statistical data has changed with the growth of 
the population and other factors as shown in the numbers presented in Lafollette’s original essay on parental licensing; Licensing 
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Lafollette argues that the impact of childhood maltreatment contributes to “significant long-term 
physical effects” such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes and cancer (LPR 331). The damages incurred to 
children who are victims of child abuse and neglect also contribute to the perpetuation of child abuse, as 
those who have experienced some form of maltreatment during childhood often go on abuse their own 
children (LPR 331). Lafollette also argues that individuals who are victims of child abuse face a higher 
risk of engagement in criminal activities (LPR 331).25    
 Lafollette follows up his assessment of the harms posed to children who become victims of child 
maltreatment with a claim as to why the costs associated with child abuse and neglect outweigh the costs 
associated with parents who are deemed to be “inattentive, self-absorbed, or unsympathetic” (LPR 332). 
On Lafollette’s view, there are two reasons for this particular discernment between different types of 
parental behaviors (LPR 332). First, the statistics surrounding the implications of child abuse indicate that 
the harms to children as a result of said abuse are extremely significant (LPR 332). Second, although 
opinions may differ as to how the behavior of parents might impact children, there appears to be a general 
consensus that child abuse and neglect are inappropriate (LPR 332). Again, Lafollette references the 
similarities between the licensing of professionals and the potential licensing of parents (LPR 332). If we 
deem it feasible to use licensing to not only ensure that individuals have the training and skills necessary 
to avoid subjecting their patients to unnecessary harms, but to also ensure that individuals promote the 
interests of innocent individuals; then we must concede that the same considerations be made in regards 
to parents and their children (LPR 332). Thus, Lafollette deems the legal emphasis on abuse and neglect 
to be reasonable in the discussion of licensing parents (LPR 332). 
                                                          
Parents (LP 182-197). The claims introduced within Lafollette’s first article pertaining to the harms children face as a result of 
abuse and neglect, were supported with data contained within the book entitled Child Maltreatment in the United States (LP 184). 
In subsequent sections of this work, I will explore current figures provided by the US Department of Health and Human Services 
in order to further support Lafollette’s argument indicating the severity of the costs to children as a result of parenting activities  
(LP 184). 
25 The figures supporting Lafollette’s claims as to the increased risk of criminality within the victims of child abuse are contained 
within Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin’s NBER paper entitled, Does Child Abuse Cause Crime? (LPR 342). Although the paper 
Lafollette referenced was released in 2007, recent studies continue to support the claim that child maltreatment leads to a greater 
risk of participation in criminal activities (LPR 342). 
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 Lafollette’s final comparison between parenting and other potentially harmful activities takes into 
account the need for those who participate in the activity  of parenting to demonstrate the possession of 
the components of competency defined as, “knowledge, abilities, judgment, and disposition” (LPR 332). 
Only Lafollette’s view, parents must exhibit “knowledge” of information that is relevant to a child’s well-
being (LPR 332). For example, such information might include a working knowledge of the symptoms of 
childhood illnesses and diseases (LPR 332). Otherwise, the child might end up receiving an incorrect 
amount of care for a potentially life-threatening illness (LPR 332). In addition, a parent must possess an 
understanding of child development in order to avoid limiting the child’s acquisition of skills such as 
reading and writing (LPR 332). Lafollette cautions that as with the knowledge held by professionals, the 
standards must not be set in such a way as to limit the participation of those who hold the skills necessary 
to participate in the rearing of children (LPR 332).  
 The next component of the competency requirements pertains to the ‘abilities’ of the individual 
engaging in the risky behavior (LPR 332). Similar to professionals within their respective fields, parents 
must possess a multitude of skills in order to successfully execute the task of parenting (LPR 332). 
Lafollette lists examples of the types of skills a parent should hold, including both intellectual and 
physical abilities (LPR 332). As with the other components of competence, Lafollette concedes to the 
possibility that it may not be feasible to give specificity to the types of abilities a parent should possess 
(LPR 332).26 Nonetheless, we can agree that individuals who lack a significant amount of abilities may be 
incapable of adequately caring for a child independent of any interference from outside entities  
(LPR 332).27 
 Another component of Lafollette’s theoretical justification of licensing parents is an individual’s 
‘judgment’ (LPR 332). In addition to the possession of knowledge and particular abilities, Lafollette 
                                                          
26 Moving forward, I will address Lafollette’s hesitation in regards to outlining specific components of the elements of 
competence necessary to participate in risky activities (LPR 329-333). I will argue that we may be able to construct a basic 
framework of certain types of knowledge, abilities, judgment capabilities, and dispositions which can help us to identify those 
who may exhibit incompetence in the rearing of children (LPR 330). 
 
27 There are many accounts of what might constitute “adequate” care in terms of how children are raised (LPR 338). I will 
discuss my views on what elements might be exhibited in the proper care of a child in later portions of the essay (LPR 338). 
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argues that an individual who wishes to raise a child must also be able to make judgments regarding the 
care of the child (LPR 332). Parents must have the ability to judge things such as adequate nutrition, the 
types of discipline used within the household, and the ways in which the child’s intellectual and social 
skills will be developed throughout childhood (LPR 333). On Lafollette’s view, if the individual lacks the 
capacity to exhibit certain judgments throughout the parenting process, there is a higher risk that harms 
might take place (LPR 333). Lafollette’s theoretical approach toward the regulation of the role of 
parenting children offers a serious affront to the normative parenting model (LPR 186). At the outset, 
Lafollette’s two-pronged justification of parental licensing establishes the necessary components for any 
act deemed to pose enough risk whereby licensure (LP 185). However, Lafollette’s claims as to why the 
family unit meets the requirement necessary for regulation via the implementation of a licensing program 
must be assessed (LP 184).  
V. A Departure from the Norm: The Theoretical Components of Licensing Parents 
  Lafollette’s support for the regulation of parenting via the parental licensing begins with an 
assessment of the potential harms that result from various parenting activities (LP 331). The statistical 
evidence of harms committed against children is evident throughout our society (LP 184). Within 
Lafollette’s first essay on parental licensing, the evidence suggested that around 400,000 and 1,000,000 
children are the victims of neglect and abuse at the hands of a parent (LP 331). Thus, the statistical 
evidence demonstrates not only that the potential for harms to occur exists, but that harms actually occur 
as a result of parenting (LP 184). Although the data set Lafollette uses is arguably outdated, recent data 
sets also support Lafollette’s claims as to the potential risks children face within the family (LP 184).  
Each year there are roughly two million confirmed cases of child abuse and neglect (LPR 331).28 
It is important to note the distinction that exists between the confirmed cases and the unconfirmed cases 
of child abuse and neglect. If we can justify interference in the family due to the risk of harms stemming 
from the act of raising children, we must also consider the fact that the potential harms may extend 
                                                          
28 Lafollette references the US Department of Health and Human Services report entitled, Child Maltreatment 2006  
(D.C: Department of Health and Human Services, 2008). 
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beyond the reported cases of abuse and neglect (LPR 331). On Lafollette’s view, the statistical data 
provides irrefutable evidentiary support for the following claim; “Parenting is an activity potentially very 
harmful to children” (LP 184). However, I would argue that the underreporting of childhood abuse and 
neglect also lends a great deal of credence to Lafollette’s claim regarding the amount of harms that result 
from parenting acts (LP 331). However, the question remains as to how one might justify interference 
with the entire institution of parenting based on the potential harms created by a certain percentage of 
individuals living in society (LP 193).  
 Prima facie, the type of interference suggested by Lafollette’s proposal appears to be extremely 
heavy-handed, after all he calls for the regulation of entire institution solely based off of the documented 
failures of the parenting model (LP 184). However, the justification for the interference caused by the 
licensure of other professions hinges on the same premise as Lafollette’s proposal for the licensing of 
parents (LP 331). Namely, although the liberal society promotes individual freedom of choice, such 
choices cannot infringe upon the well-being of other individuals (T 26). As with other professions where 
the potential risk of harm is thought to be higher than that of other activities, licensing can decrease the 
amount of individuals who might have otherwise been seriously injured (LP 329). Although the 
profession of medicine has been regulated for countless number of years, the regulation does not exist 
based on confirmed cases of physician neglect, it exists in order to restrict the number of individuals 
participating in an activity that poses high risks of harm to others (LP 329).29 Thus, the same justification 
can be made for parental licensing, the statistics provide evidence as to the risks associated with the act, 
but the dynamics of the action lend theoretical support to the licensing of the activity (LP 329). 
                                                          
29 Although there are countless arguments against the state regulation of certain professions such as medicine, on my view the 
state has a duty to ensure that trades practiced within the public sphere do not cause undue harm to its citizens (LP 183). 
Therefore, I take the position that state regulation of activities which pose an increased risk of harm to others is a necessary 
interference in the lives of otherwise autonomous individuals (LP 183). Questions as to how much government regulation is 
sufficient to prevent harms from occurring and worries as to the methods used to implement the regulation of certain professions 
are important (LPR 337). However, I limit such inquiry at this particular time as questions of this nature pertain more towards the 
implementation of regulatory programs, as opposed to considerations focused solely on the examination of the moral justification 
for the state’s regulation of professions (LPR 338). 
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 There are those who will argue that the state’s involvement in the licensing of certain 
professionals in our society qualifies as an instance of an excessive amount of interference (LPR 338). 
However, I would disagree with the assumption that actions can either be unjustly regulated by the state 
or justly unregulated (LPR 338). The harm principle does not address the exact manner in which one 
might interfere with harms (T 50). As Cohen notes, “the principle says that it is permissible to interfere 
when there is a harm – that this is when toleration can rightly end.” (T 50). Thus, according to the harm 
principle, state interference in actions that result in harm is merely a choice to pursue one manner of 
permissible interference in the actions of individuals (T 50).  
I would argue that those who deem state regulation as a form of interference do not believe that 
the specific actions performed in the profession pose negligible harms to others (LPR 337-338). Rather, 
the argument against state regulation is formulated from a general disapproval of the costs associated with 
state interference (T 50). However, such concerns do not contain a “principled reason” as to why the act 
in question must be tolerated (T 50). As such, any avoidance of interference with harmful actions due to a 
disdain for varying forms of state interference are not justifiable under the terms set forth in the harm 
principle (T 50).  
In addition, concerns as to the costs associated with the justification of state interference in 
matters taking place between consenting adults (namely that such interference impedes upon the 
individual’s autonomy) also fail to negate the importance of the praesumptio harm principle (T 50). 
Children present a special case entirely in the discussion of the entities that might be justified in executing 
various forms of interference, as children are not the sorts of individuals who can consent  
(T 114). I would argue that the state may be justified in the execution of various forms of intervention on 
behalf of those who cannot consent, nor protect themselves from being exposed to harm, children (T 119). 
One might disagree as to whether the state or a different localized entity (such as a privately held 
company or organization) might offer superior forms of intervention (LP 337). However, such concerns 
fail to undermine the justifications set forth in the harm principle that justify interference if wrongful 
setbacks of interest do indeed occur (T 40-46). 
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  Daniel Engster addresses the conflict between the private parenting model and a liberal 
conception of justice The Place of Parenting within a Liberal Theory of Justice: The Private Parenting 
Model, Parental Licenses, or Public Parenting Support? (PP 233-262) 30 Engster notes that the decision 
to have and raise children has a long-standing tradition of being considered to be a predominantly private 
activity(PP 233). Typically, individual choose to have children without any interference from any 
government entity, and subsequently take on the task of raising their children privately (PP 233). Thus, 
parents pose a special set of issues that professionals working in disciplines such as medicine or the law 
do not, particularly in terms of government interference (PP 234). Medical professionals are incapable of 
legally making the choice to practice medicine independent of any outside constraints (LP 183). Imagine 
the calamity which would ensue if individuals could not only make the private choice to become a doctor, 
but also had the ability to begin to practice medicine on others as a supposed “doctor” (LP 183). 
However, our society not only allows, but supports the private decision to become a parent and to raise 
children (PP 233). The question remains as to why an activity that poses such risks to a vulnerable subset 
of society continues to be considered a “private project” in our society (PP 236). I would argue that 
Lafollette is correct to argue for the failed justification for the assumed dichotomy that exists between the 
activity of parenting and any other activity that exposes others to potential harms (PP 331).  
The “private parenting model” is the prevailing view of how the rearing of children should take 
place in our society (PP 233). Rational individuals are not only assumed to be capable of making the 
choice to have children and subsequently raise them, but they are also assumed to have the resources and 
capacities needed to succeed as a parent (PP 233). Questions as to the possession of certain levels of 
competency and potential state interference into the family unit are raised only when certain factors 
indicate the possible existence of abuse or neglect within the family unit (PP 234). However, the 
argument Lafollette raises is still salient, as one must justify why acts such as parenting are not subject to 
the same regulations as other potentially harmful activities (LPR 331). One must consider whether the 
                                                          
30 Daniel Engster’s essay will be cited as follows: PP refers to The Place of Parenting Within a Liberal Theory of Justice: The 
Private Parenting Model, Parental Licenses, or Public Parenting Support? (Florida: Social Theory and Practice, 2010). 
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justification for the private parenting model hinges on purely normative views as to how children have 
previously been raised within our society, or the systematic merits resulting from the continuation of the 
model itself (PP 236). 
On Lafollette’s view parenting appears to be an activity that requires certain levels of 
“competency, knowledge, abilities, judgment, and dispositions” (LPR 329). The question is whether or 
not the private parenting model allows parents to bypass the demonstration of certain abilities in order to 
promote the importance of individual choice in the matter (PP 233). Within the private parenting model 
there remains an underlying assumption that all of the capacities, as mentioned above, exist within any 
individual who chooses to become a parent (PP 234). Such an assumption fails to understand the 
significance of the qualifications necessary to decrease the risk of potential harms posed to children as a 
result of the activity of parenting (LPR 331). One must wonder whether the activity of parenting truly 
requires a unique set of skills in order to dispel the potential risk of harms posed to children  
(LPR 332-333). Perhaps can one argue that Lafollette is merely imposing restrictions on a private choice 
which should remain independent of such considerations (LPR 334). I would argue that parenting is an 
activity that poses significant risks to children, and such risks can be significantly reduced if the 
individuals who wish to become parents can demonstrate that they possess certain abilities (LP 329). 
Moving forward, I will explore the significance of the skills Lafollette presents within the theoretical 
justification of the licensing of parents (LPR 329). 
First, one must consider the magnitude of the responsibilities the task of parenting presents to 
those wishing to engage in raising children (LPR 333-334). Raising a child is an arguably strenuous task, 
requiring the balance of a multitude of mental and physical capabilities in order to foster a child’s 
development (LPR 333-334). In addition, parents have an inordinate amount of control over children 
during their most formidable years of life (LPR 332-333). However, the question remains as to whether or 
not the characteristics Lafollette ascribes to parenting are necessary components of raising children 
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(LPR 332-333). One might argue that Lafollette is mistaken in his assessment of the qualifications one 
must possess to be a parent, as he may be ascribing duties to parents that are purely subjective in nature      
(LPR 332-333).  
Lafollette mentions the manner in which a parent might “fail to love, care for, encourage, and 
guide her children in many ways, ways that can cause them serious harm” (LPR 332-333). However, 
Lafollette chooses to direct his argument toward the possession of particular skills that decrease the 
potential of harm to children, as opposed other character flaws which might also impact a child 
(LPR 332). After all, many parents might be considered to be egotistical, apathetic, or absentminded in 
terms of the manner in which they raise their child (LPR 332). One potential flaw in Lafollette’s 
justifications is that his argument fails to include a variety of character traits into the components he 
deems necessary to exhibit competency during the task of raising children (LPR 332). 
In addition, Lafollette argues that the demonstration of particular skills is necessary in order to 
ensure that one might have the ability to competently engage in the activity of raising children (LPR 332). 
Lafollette’s claims rest on the evidence of harms provided through the study of relevant statistical data 
(LPR 332). Thus, the level of specificity with which Lafollette approaches the topic of competency allows 
for a holistic assessment of an individual’s ability to engage in the act of raising children, without 
subjecting the child to any form of abuse or neglect (LPR 332). Lafollette agrees with the critics of the 
competence requirement on the subject of whether or not other parental inadequacies exist which might 
cause some disruption to the normalized take on childhood (LPR 332). However, Lafollette argues that 
the empirical evidence of the harms suffered by the victims of child abuse and neglect are “highly 
significant” (LPR 332). Thus, Lafollette’s theoretical proposal remains committed to the incorporation of 
preventative measures within the parental model in order to decrease occurrences of child abuse and 
neglect (LPR 332).  
The question remains as to what constitutes a “wrongful” setback to the interests of a child  
(T 40). The normative structure of the family provides an environment for children that allows for 
parental choice in the various facets of the child’s life (PP 235). Children are brought up in the cultural 
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institution known as the family, and differences in parenting methods are prevalent throughout society 
(PLC 272-273).31 Ron Mallen considers the ways in which children might develop a sense of cultural 
membership during their childhood years as a result of being raised in the normative family unit in 
Political Liberalism, Cultural Membership, and the Family (PLC 271).32 Prima facie, considering the 
actions that might constitute a “wrongful” setback of interests in the context of the family environment 
appears to be extremely difficult, complicated by the variance of cultural norms that exist throughout our 
society (T 114). How might one assign value to the actions occurring in the family considering the fact 
that parents have a variety of ways in which to raise children? (T 114). Assessing such variances might 
prove to be extremely complicated without an objective means by which to evaluate the family (T 114). 
Mallen considers the plethora of differences emanating from within the normative family unit as follows: 
Different families will offer different opportunities, different amounts of parental skill and 
parental investment, different numbers of siblings and other relatives, different immediate 
communities, and even different quantities of love, they cannot help but differentially affect 
children’s life prospects (PLC 273). 
Careful consideration must be given to the evaluation of parental actions, particularly concerning the 
moment that an action can no longer be defined as a difference in cultural norms, but as a wrongful 
setback of interests (T 114) Cohen’s belief in “objective claims in morality” correctly ascertains that 
cultural membership does not automatically negate one’s ability to discover whether certain acts are 
morally problematic (T 114). Moving forward, I will demonstrate that wrongful acts can be identified 
outside the consideration of cultural norms and differences in parenting styles (T 114).  
 Although families are considered to be distinctive and unique units, we must not assume that an 
objective evaluation of the actions of parents is unattainable (T 114). Cultures that promote indiscriminate 
                                                          
31 Moving forward, the family will be defined as follows, “those cultural institutions that consist of one or more adults who are 
primarily responsible for the upbringing of one or more children, and are prototypically (though not essentially) comprised of 
biological relatives of the children in a close and affective relationship with the children” (PLC 271). 
 
32 Ron Mallen’s essay will be cited as follows: PLC refers to Political Liberalism, Cultural Membership, and the Family (Florida: 
Social Theory and Practice, 1999). 
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killing and other problematic behaviors can be viewed as problematic in terms of their long-term viability 
(T 114). In addition, some cultures are extremely similar, and as such make it more difficult to access the 
superiority of one culture over the other (T 114). According to Cohen, “All this can be said about parents 
as well. Parents who routinely abuse their children, leave them in a closet all the time, throw boiling water 
on them, starve them, or rape them are simply not good parents” (T 115). I would argue that such actions 
are not only to be considered as examples of bad parenting, but also constitute wrongful acts. Thus 
wrongful acts can be defined as those actions that cause children to endure undue suffering (T 115). 
Children are similar to other sentient beings insofar as they possess “an interest in not suffering”  
(T 118).33 Thus, instances whereby the actions of a rational adult cause a child to suffer can be deemed as 
“wrongful” setback of interests (T 118). Next, I will explore some examples of parental behaviors that 
resulted in causing undue suffering to a child, in order to demonstrate clear instances of parents who 
wrongfully setback the interests of their children (T 117).  
Consider the following examples:  
Example A: A Philadelphia mother left her twenty-one year old son (who suffered from cerebral palsy) in 
a wooded area by a major highway and promptly boarded a bus to Maryland in order to visit her 
boyfriend (CN 3).34 According to law enforcement officials, the young victim suffered from “eye 
problems, dehydration, malnutrition and a cut to his back that raised infection concerns” as a result of 
being exposed to below freezing temperatures for approximately four days (CN 3). 
Example B: A group of four Nebraska adults (two of which were identified as the parents of the victims) 
were accused of keeping four children in a wire dog care inside of a trailer littered with “trash, dirty 
                                                          
33 I take it to be an uncontroversial fact that children have an interest in not suffering (T 118). In addition, Cohen’s view 
summarizes my thoughts on this particular topic (T 118). Cohen argues, “That there is such an interest seems clear when we 
recognize that when it suffers, a being recoils, trying to avoid the suffering” (T 118). 
 
34Articles referenced from the CNN news website will be listed as follows: CN 3 refers to the CNN Cable News Network article 
entitled, “Mom in 'treatment' after leaving quadriplegic son in woods, police say” (Atlanta: Cable News Network, 2015). CN 1 
refers to the CNN Cable News Network article entitled, “4 accused of keeping children in dog cage make court appearance” 
(Atlanta: Cable News Network, 2011). CN 2 refers to the CNN Cable News Network article entitled, “Couple Accused of 
Torturing Children Allegedly Pulled out Kids' Toenails, Beat Them with Hammers” (Atlanta: Cable News Network, 2005). 
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clothing, food and animal feces and urine” (CN 1). Law enforcement officials found two children, ages 
three and five inside of the metal kennel that was secured with a wire tie (CN 1). The dog kennel 
reportedly contained a mattress where the children could sleep while they were in the cage (CN 1). Two 
other children were found outside of the kennel but were also considered to be in danger due to the unsafe 
living conditions of the trailer (CN 1). 
Example C: A Florida couple was accused of torturing five out of seven living in their home  
(CN 2). The couple forced the children to sleep in a closet with a wind-chime attached to the door so as to 
alert the adults if the children left the closet (CN 2). The couple was accused of several acts of child 
maltreatment, including the use of either a stun gun or a cattle prod to shock the children, chaining the 
children up in certain areas of the house with metal chains, hitting the children’s feet with hammers, and 
pulling out the children’s toenails with pliers (CN 2). According to authorities, two fourteen-year-old 
boys living in the household were so malnourished they weighed thirty-six pounds, the typical weight of a 
four-year-old (CN 2).  
In all of the examples, there are clear cases of actions that cause children to suffer in some way, 
shape, or form. Example A demonstrates parental actions that resulted in the child suffering multiple 
physical injuries as a result of being exposed to the elements for an extended period of time, thus 
“wrongfully” setting back the young victim’s interest in not suffering the injuries incurred as a result of 
being left in the woods (CN 3). Example B illustrates the prolonged confinement of children in an 
inhumane way, a direct result of the actions of the adults responsible for the care of the children, thus 
“wrongfully” setting back the children’s interest in not suffering psychological and possible physical 
impairments as a result of living inside of a dog cage during their formative years (CN 1). Example C 
exhibits parental actions that resulted in the suffering of multiple children, as a result of being subjected to 
physical abuse at the hands of their caregivers; thus “wrongfully” setting back the children’s interest in 
not suffering from prolonged and unwarranted physical pain (CN 2).  
In each case, specific parental actions led to the suffering of children, thus signifying a 
“wrongful” setback of interests (T 40). Arguably determining whether or not a child’s interests have been 
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wrongfully setback is a difficult task (T 117). However, I would argue that although the moral questions 
may indeed be difficult to assess this does not imply that an objective answer as to what types of 
behaviors constitute “wrongs” does not exist (T 121). Although it may be difficult to ascertain which 
particular actions “wrongfully” setback a child’s interests, establishing a definitive view of “wrongs” as 
those actions that cause undue suffering to children can help to clarify future consideration of the subject 
of the wrongful setback of a child’s interests (T 119). 
Lafollette notes that there are a variety of disagreements surrounding the issue of how to classify 
and subsequently address parental behaviors that might be seen as inappropriate in nature (LPR 332). 
There remains little debate as to whether or not child abuse and neglect constitute inappropriate adult 
behavior (LPR 332). However, I would argue that a rational individual would view the harms brought 
about as a result of subjecting a child to abuse and neglect as a wrongful setback of the child’s interests 
which falls directly in line with the guiding factors of the harm principle (T 64-65). Moving forward, I 
will discuss my views on the debate regarding the question of whether or not children have rights or 
merely interests (CFS 1). 
VI. The Great Debate: The Moral Status of Children (Interests & Rights) 
 In addressing Lafollette’s concerns as to the harms resulting from the act of parenting, we must 
also address the question of whether or not children are the types of individuals capable of holding rights 
(CFS 1). Within Lafollette’s theoretical justification of parental licensing, we must consider whether the 
harms inflicted on children are to be viewed as a breach of rights or a setback of interests (CFS 1). First, 
we must answer a question that is one of the underlying themes of Lafollette’s theoretical inquiry, namely 
we must ascertain the moral status of children (LP 182-197). Next, we must consider what the moral 
status of children requires in the instances where a child’s status is violated (TM 2). 35 Once we formulate 
a plausible conception of the ethical considerations of children, we must then assess what a commitment 
to the accepted moral status of children means for the development of the principles of justice in our 
                                                          
35 Samantha Brennan and Robert Noggle’s essay will be cited via as following: TM refers to: The Moral Status of Children: 
Children’s Rights, Parents’ Rights, and Family Justice (Florida: Social Theory and Practice, 1997). 
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society (TM 18). In addition, we must be careful to adopt principles within our conception of justice that 
address violations of a child’s moral status (TM 22).  
Moving forward, I will explore the ethical considerations for children as set forth by Samantha 
Brennan and Robert Noggle in, The Moral Status of Children: Children’s Rights, Parents’ Rights, and 
Family Justice.36 The authors present a thorough assessment of the factors leading towards the theoretical 
development of a view on the moral status of children which directly supports Lafollette’s justifications 
of the theoretical parental licensing proposal (TM 1).37 I will argue that acceptance of the moral status 
presented within Brennan and Noggle’s essay will allow us to move forward with a clear understanding of 
what justice requires from adults living in a society whereby potential violations of a child’s moral status 
are bound to occur (TM 1).38 After offering an overview of the claims set forth in the Brennan and Noggle 
essay, I will demonstrate how the authors’ views lend credence to Lafollette’s theoretical proposal as a 
viable means of reforming public policies pertaining to children (TM 2). 
 Brennan and Noggle offer some insight into the moral considerations given to the status of 
children’s rights within the discussion of family justice (TM 1). The authors frame three 
“commonsensical claims” regarding the moral status of children in such a way as to clarify the conflicts 
that exist between the normative views of children and rights (TM 1). Primarily the argument centers on 
the following claims: “that children deserve the same moral consideration as adults, that they can 
nevertheless be treated differently from adults, and that parents have limited authority to direct their 
upbringing” (TM 1). Within the justification of parental licensing, an understanding of the relevance of 
the moral status of children is crucial, as it allows one to understand whether or not certain acts involving 
children are in direct opposition to the child’s moral status (TM 2).  
                                                          
 
37 The primary goal of Brennan and Noggle’s essay is to address the constraints on theoretical proposals regarding the moral 
status of children in order to determine how both public policy and ethical considerations of the nature of parental actions might 
be impacted. I believe that Lafollette’s parental licensing proposal addresses how the institution of the family might change as a 
result of a retooling of how one comes to think of the moral status of children (TM 1-2). 
 
38 In a perfect society whereby each adult understands and accepts the moral status of children, violations of a child’s moral status 
would not occur (TM 1-22). However, on my view a theory of justice must also include considerations of how non-compliance 
might impact the status of others (TM 1-22).  
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 The primary goal of Brennan and Noggle’s essay is to address constraints set forth in theoretical 
proposals regarding the moral status of children, alongside the conflicts which result from the 
“commonsense” understanding of children’s moral status in society (TM 2). The authors also consider   
the issue of public policy reforms in relation to the moral considerations given to children (TM 2). 
Brennan and Noggle isolate three claims deemed to be compatible with acceptable ethical theories 
pertaining to children (TM 2). The first commonsense claim, the “Equal Consideration Thesis” places the 
moral status of children on the same level as the moral status of adults (TM 2). Namely, the thesis 
equalizes the moral consideration for children with that of the adult population (TM 2). As a result of 
adherence to this thesis, one must regard children in a manner consistent with others who hold the same 
moral status, and one must take the moral claims of children to be as relevant as those of adults (TM 3). 
In essence, the “Equal Consideration Thesis” allows for the moral status of children to remain separated 
from those biases generally associated with age considerations (TM 3).  
In addition, Brennan and Noggle note that a commitment to providing equal moral consideration 
to separate entities does not require that both parties have the same moral rights and duties (TM 3). On 
Brennan and Noggle’s view children are persons, and as such they are entitled to specific moral 
considerations by virtue of being human beings (TM 3).39 As such, if we attribute a particular moral status 
to all those who are considered to be persons, children would hold the same moral status as all other 
persons (TM 3). If we deny children the moral status held by other persons, we either reinforce the idea 
children are not to be considered persons, or the concept that individuals do not hold a particular moral 
status as a result of being found to be a person (TM 3).  
 The “Equal Consideration Thesis” allows one to understand the moral status of children in 
relation to the moral status of other individuals  (TM 3). The thesis is extremely relevant to Lafollette’s 
theoretical justification of parental licensing, as it allows for a fundamental understanding of the moral 
                                                          
39 Within the line of argumentation contained in this thesis, I wish to avoid the debate as to the exact moment when an entity 
should be considered a person (TM 3). On my view, children have enough capacities and distinguishing traits to constitute 
persons (TM 3). Whether or not they are ‘future persons’ is also an extensive debate that leads us off the topic of parental 
licensing and the negation of child abuse and neglect (LP 182-197). For the purposes of this project, children are to be considered 
persons, with the potential to have an unspecified future should they live what we believe to be an average lifespan (TM 3).  
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status of children independent of the normative considerations imposed upon children as a result of the 
consideration of age and maturity (TM 3). If we deem children to hold the same moral status as other 
persons, we cannot discount instances in which they might be wronged as a result of a violation of their 
moral status (TM 3). In addition, I would argue that cases whereby a rational individual’s moral status is 
deemed to be infringed upon in some manner also apply to children (TM 3). Predicated upon an 
understanding of the types of actions that infringe upon the moral status of persons we can move forward 
with the consideration of acts that violate the moral status of children (TM 2). Thus, we circumnavigate 
the need for separate conceptions of the moral status of children and adults (TM 2). On Brennan and 
Noggle’s view (which I find to be quite salient), children are to be subject to the same moral 
considerations as all other persons, thus simplifying the assessment of potential infringement of their 
moral status (TM 3). 
 The next thesis contained in the commonsensical view of a child’s moral status is called “The 
Unequal Treatment Thesis” (TM 3). According to Brennan and Noggle, the thesis legitimizes the 
rationale behind the manner in which children are treated differently than adults (TM 3). The authors 
argue that the second thesis is a widely held tenant within a normative conception of the moral status of 
children (TM 3). Thus, any moral theory that denies or contradicts the second thesis would most likely be 
difficult for most individuals to accept (TM 3). An example of the second thesis can be seen in the 
limitations set forth within our society as to the types of activities children are “legitimately prevented” 
from doing, despite the fact that the same prohibitions on the activities of adults would be deemed 
unacceptable (TM 3). We limit a child’s ability to buy or consume alcoholic beverages, we do not permit 
children to purchase or own guns, and we also do not allow children to engage in the voting process  
(TM 3). Such limitations are indeed unequal, as we legitimately allow adults to engage in the same 
activities that are deemed impermissible for children to participate in (TM 3). Outside of the “appeal to 
intuition” and “appeal to tradition,” public policy considerations also support the “Unequal Treatment 
Thesis” (TM 3-4). 
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 As a matter of public policy, a shift allowing children (irrespective of their moral status) to vote 
or to use their judgment in the consumption of alcoholic beverages is utterly implausible (TM 3). In 
addition, it would set back a child’s interests to craft public policy that allows unrestricted access to 
potentially harmful substances and environments (TM 3). Brennan and Noggle also argue that most 
rational adults consider the “Unequal Treatment Theory” to be plausible in terms of the need to restrict 
themselves from harms that might have occurred during childhood, and would subsequently agree to 
“give a sort of retroactive consent to having has various sorts of restrictions placed on us when we were 
children-even if we did not agree with them at the time” (TM 4).  
The concept of “retroactive consent” can also be applied to restricting actions others impose upon 
the individual during childhood (TM 4). Imagine the plausibility of a moral theory that allowed one to 
understand violations of one’s moral status in terms of actions deemed to be retroactively impermissible 
(TM 4). Arguably, a commitment to the second thesis might also aid in the expansion of the concept that 
there may be actions committed against the individual in childhood that are deemed as impermissible in 
hindsight (TM 4). If one has an interest in restricting the potential harms resulting from unfettered access 
to acts typically considered permissible for adults, one arguably also has an interest in limiting those 
actions committed against herself which are deemed to be potentially harmful as well (TM 4).  
The final component of the commonsense theses which is aptly named “The Limited Rights 
Thesis,” pertains to the discretion exhibited by parents during the rearing of children (TM 4). The premise 
of the thesis involves an awareness of the limitations of children and a parent’s ability to subsequently 
exercise their judgment due to the child’s lack of maturity (TM 4).  Children are limited in a number of 
ways; cognitively speaking they lack the power and the experience adults have to make rational decisions 
(TM 4). As a result, we deem parents to be the entities responsible for making choices for their children 
on a daily basis (TM 4). Everything from the type of clothing a child will wear, to the manner of 
schooling the child will receive (i.e. public or private school education), to the type of food the child will 
eat, and the manner of discipline the child will receive is thus regulated by the parents (TM 4). Herein lies 
the key issue, there are negative externalities associated with the normative views regarding a parent’s 
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authority over the upbringing of a child (TM 20-21). Although the “Limited Parental Rights Thesis” is 
described as a claim dictating the “thresholds” of parental rights, we must consider when such limits are 
reached within the act of raising children (TM 8). 
Brennan and Noggle argue that two of the commonsense claims, the “Equal Consideration 
Thesis” and the “Limited Parental Rights Thesis” conflict with one another (TM 8). We must decide how 
to treat children with the same moral considerations as adults while simultaneously allowing parents the 
authority to make decisions regarding the child’s formative years (TM 8). The key to balancing both 
claims begins with an understanding of parental rights, particularly in regards to the inherent thresholds 
contained within the “Limited Parental Rights Thesis” (TM 8). According to Brennan and Noggle, the 
threshold aspect of a right pertains to a set of conditions which can override the right if one of the two 
conditions is met (TM 8). The two conditions are as follows:  
1. If a right conflicts with a stronger right, it is permissible to defeat the weaker right (TM 8).  
2. An example of this might be a scenario where the knife in my hand will either be thrown at 
Madison’s arm or Preston’s chest. Madison’s right not to be harmed by being stabbed in the 
arm is defeated by Preston’s right not to be stabbed in the heart (TM 8). If overriding a right 
will bring about significant benefits to others, it is permissible to defeat the right (TM 8). 
Another example of this condition would be the right to carry a loaded firearm. In general, 
the right to carry a firearm is a serious affair. However, we can think of scenarios in which it 
would be permissible to infringe upon the right to own a firearm. For instance, carrying the 
unconcealed loaded gun into a classroom full of children might present a grave danger to the 
classroom environment. A child might gain control of the firearm and harm themselves or 
others in the classroom or panic might break out as a result of carrying a visible firearm into 
the educational environment. Therefore, most individuals would deem it permissible to 
“defeat” the right of the gun owner to possess the firearm in order to ensure the safety of     
  others (TM 9). 
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On Brennan and Noggle’s view, “both of the conditions for overriding a right are often satisfied 
in interactions between parents and children, when parental rights conflict with children’s rights and 
children’s needs”  (TM 9). The relationship between a parent and a child meets the first “overriding” 
condition, as the parent’s right to make choices which involve the child is overridden as soon as the 
“child’s right not to be harmed” is violated (TM 9).40 In order to deny the “override” of the first condition 
of parental rights, one would have to posit a threshold for parental rights that was strong enough to negate 
a child’s right not to be harmed (TM 9).  
Children are one of the most vulnerable demographics of our society; thus it seems nonsensical to 
think that parental rights would somehow trump a child’s right not to be harmed (TM 9). Children cannot 
consent to the actions they are subjected to, nor can they remove themselves from dangerous or even life 
threatening situations (T 190). Such a parental right would be akin to ownership or property rights over 
the child, whereby the parent would have the ultimate discretion in the treatment of the child (TM 9). In 
essence a parental right whereby parents essentially possess property rights over their children would 
negate the child’s not to be harmed, and give the parent the subsequent right to make choices regarding 
the child, carte blanche (T 190). The desire to adopt such a drastic threshold for parental rights is likely to 
be non-existent within our modern society (TM 9). Thus, the child’s right not to be harmed trumps the 
parental right to make unrestricted choices concerning the child’s well-being (TM 9).  
The second overriding condition is one which can be satisfied in certain cases where child’s 
specific needs aren’t met (TM 9). On Brennan and Noggle’s view, the benefit to the child’s well-being 
often justifies interfering with the rights of a parent (TM 9). The authors refrain from offering a full 
account of instances whereby a child’s needs might not be met, opting for a few clarifications of the 
limitations of the second overriding condition (TM 9). First, Brennan and Noggle argue that the parent’s 
rights are significant, and as such the value placed upon the rights of parents deters individuals from 
                                                          
40 This section contains an overview of rights from a section in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entitled Rights that will 
be referenced as follows SP (California, The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, 
2011). 
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interfering with said rights if such interference only provides “marginal benefit” to the child (TM 9). 
Therefore, instances of varying degrees of financial security between sets of parents would not require the 
termination of parental rights for individuals who were financially worse off than others (TM 9).41 In 
addition, the parents’ rights might be “overridden” if a violation of the child’s rights takes place (thereby 
negating the moral status they share with other individuals), or if the child’s needs are not being met.  
(TM 10). Therefore, if a child is abused or severely neglected, it would be justifiable for the parents to 
potentially lose their parental rights (TM 10). 
In addition, the overriding conditions might allow one to argue for the use of the conditions in 
order to address the “potential substantial benefit to people other than the parents or the children 
involved” (TM 10). Thus, the interests the citizens have in the manner in which the children are raised 
might give credence to the negation of parental rights (TM 10). On this view, which I shall call the “Jan 
Narveson Perspective,” parents hold “property rights” in children, although such rights are limited due to 
the impact which children have on other individuals (TM 10). Thus, we are justified in limiting parental 
rights in order to minimize the resulting impact to others (TM 10). However, it is important to note that 
Brennan and Noggle reject Narveson’s view as to the property rights parents holdover children, primarily 
because the moral status of children presupposes that a child cannot be considered to be the property of 
those who possess the same moral status as the child (TM 10).  
Prima facie, Lafollette’s view appears to be one that is primarily concerned with the potential 
harms children themselves might suffer, as opposed to the potential harms others might incur as a result 
of child abuse or neglect taking place in the home (LPR 331). Lafollette considers the impact to others (as 
a result of the interactions individuals will have with those who have faced forms of child abuse ) as a 
secondary concern, noting that individuals subjected to childhood maltreatment have higher propensity to 
engage in criminal acts (LPR 331). I share Lafollette’s concern for the safety of others, particularly in 
                                                          
41 However, I would argue that certain instances of financial ineptitude might be serious enough to infringe upon a child’s 
interests in having their nutritional needs met, or their housing, and educational needs met (LP 332).  In subsequent sections, I 
will explore this worry alongside Lafollette’s concerns about the possible instances of parental instability (LP 329).  
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light of the statistical evidence demonstrating the social ills that  result from those who have suffered 
maltreatment at an early age (LPR 331).42 Protecting other individuals from the acts exhibited by those 
who have previously been victimized by child abuse or  neglect can be seen as a secondary concern about 
the ramifications of child abuse and neglect (LPR 331).  
In addition, altering parental rights due to the potential harms abused children might inflict on 
others falls in line with the harm principle, as said individuals set back the potential victims interest in not 
being harmed (T 65). If one can demonstrate the propensity for harm to occur at the hands of individuals 
who have been previously abused or neglected during childhood, it seems permissible to interfere with the 
actions that set back the interest the individual has in not being harmed during their childhood (T 64-65). 
In addition, interference is permissible due to the greater risks those who come into contact with the 
victim of child abuse  or neglect are exposed to (T 64-65). However, if we remain committed to 
Lafollette’s theoretical proposal for parental licensing, we must identify harms to children as the primary 
reason for the implementation of regulations in  the act of child rearing (LPR 331). Thus, on Lafollette’s 
view, the third application of Brennan and Noggle’s overriding conditions (the consideration of the 
impact children have on the well-being of others) is simply another element of harm stemming from the 
initial violation of the child’s moral status (TM 332). Brennan and Noggle’s three commonsensical claims 
as to the moral status of children, combined with the authors’ position on the nature of parental rights thus 
leads us to the following: 
1. Parents possess rights. 
2. The rights parents possess include rights that are held over their children. 
3. Even though parents have rights over their children, parental rights have thresholds. 
Therefore,  
                                                          
42 The statistical data contained within the National Institute of Justice report entitled, “Impact of Child Abuse and Maltreatment 
on Delinquency, Arrest and Victimization” will be referred to as follows, NIJ (Washington, D.C., U.S. Dept. of Justice, 2011). 
The study suggests that individuals who have been abused or neglected have an increased risk of engaging in behaviors which 
result in arrests (NIJ 1). Furthermore, the study also suggests that higher rates of “officially recognized delinquency, violent self-
reporting delinquency, and moderate self-reported delinquency” occur as a result of child-maltreatment (NIJ 1).  
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4. It is permissible to infringe upon the rights of parents based on the limitations set forth within the 
thresholds. 
5. Interference with parental rights ensures that a child’s needs are met or to preserve the rights of    
the child. 
Therefore,  
6. Parents who fail to meet their child’s needs, or who fail to preserve the child’s rights will have 
their parental rights overridden. (TM 1-22).43 
 
On Brennan and Noggle’s view, the conceptualization of parental rights as rights with “built-in 
thresholds” allows for parental rights to exist alongside the equal consideration of the moral status of 
children (TM 11). Thus the initial conflict between the “Equal Treatment of Children Thesis” (the claim 
concerning the equal moral status which exists amongst both children and adults) and the “Limited 
Parental Rights Thesis” (the claim legitimizing parental right to exercise “limited but significant 
discretion in raising children”) is resolved (TM 11). Moving forward with the claims set forth in the 
Brennan and Noggle argument creates a frame of reference whereby one might formulate moral 
guidelines to address the status of children along with the rights parents hold over their children (TM 11).  
Lafollette’s justification of a theoretical parental licensing program contains the same structure as the 
Brennan and Noggle argument (TM 1-26). Lafollette’s proposal aims to treat the act of parenting in such 
a way so as to require a particular skill set in order to minimize the risk of harms to children  
(LPR 331). The theoretical licensing proposal offers restraints to the act of parenting that inherently value 
the moral status of children (LPR 331). In addition, it is important to consider that even if children are 
thought to hold the same moral status as adults, it does not necessitate the dissolution of parental rights 
(TM 9). Adherence to such a view of morality would only justify interference with parental rights if and 
                                                          
43 It is important to note that Brennan and Noggle believe that parental rights can be overridden, “even if they do not actively 
harm the child” (TM 11). This claim is formulated on the consideration of acts which fail to preserve the rights of the child  
(TM 10).  
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when parents either fail to preserve the rights of children or fail to ensure that the needs of children     
(TM 10). At this particular juncture, we have a sound concept of the moral status of children, and we 
understand how the acceptance of this situation impacts the rights parents hold over their children  
(TM 1-11). However, the question remains as to how one can justify interference within the “intimate 
relationships” contained within the family (TM 14). 
If parental rights can be “overridden” in certain circumstances as a result of certain moral 
considerations, we must ascertain how such an act can become a component of a society filled with 
individuals pursuing their desires and passions to live a good life (TM 18). Thus, we must take a closer 
look at how we might incorporate rules as to how we should live our lives into the broader picture of the 
structures that govern our society (TM 18-22). Furthermore, serious consideration must be given as to 
what can be gained by a commitment to institutions that would uphold certain moral principles in a 
society despite the existence of various cultural and religious convictions (TM 14-15). Why is the 
commitment to uphold the moral status of children within the family so relevant in a liberal society?  
(TM 18-19).  
In the next portion of this essay, I will argue that Lafollette’s theoretical justification for parental 
licensing must be conceived as one particularly way in which the equalization of opportunity can occur 
within our society (LP 182-196). There are various institutions with different measures focused on the 
equalizing of opportunity for individuals (EOO 376-377). However, the current institutions do not adopt 
the time frame that I believe holds the potential to provide improvements in the manner in which people 
come to hold particular talents and skills (EOO 378). Thus far, I have shown Lafollette’s theoretical 
parental licensing program to be compatible with the harm principle, insofar as the licensing program’s 
primary objective is interference in order to prevent harm (i.e. setback of interests) which may occur to 
children during childhood (T 65). I also demonstrated how a commitment to an equalization of the moral 
status of children and adults can provide a moral litmus test of sorts for the validation of actions involving 
the well-being of children (TM 11). Lafollette’s theoretical parental licensing program is formulated with 
the same moral considerations as those contained within Brennan and Noggle’s assessment of the moral 
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status of children and parental rights (TM 11). Considering which actions might violate the moral 
standing of children without negating parental rights to raise their children in the manner they see fit is a 
complicated process (TM 15-16). However, Lafollette’s theoretical parental license is rooted in the same 
justifications given to other actions posing risks to others such as the practice of medicine or the practice 
of law (LP 182).  
I will argue that Lafollette’s theoretical licensing proposal contains the potential to equalize 
opportunity within society (LP 182-197). Thus, parental licensing should be considered to be an effective 
way to minimize the occurrence of harms to children during childhood while simultaneously allowing for 
children to receive equal access to an environment that lessens their exposure to child abuse and neglect 
(LPR 331). Valuing the cessation of harms against children and the moral status of children leads us to 
question the types of institutions within society which will honor a commitment to protect the moral 
status of children by limiting the harms children may be exposed to as they develop into autonomous 
individuals (LPR 327-343). 
 
VII. Constructing the Timeframe: Problems with the Equalization of Opportunity 
 Claire Chambers addresses problems contained within liberal egalitarian theories of equality of 
opportunity in the essay; Each Outcome is Another Opportunity: Problems with the Moment of Equal 
Opportunity.44 Chambers argues that the methods used to support egalitarian equality of opportunity 
arguments is inherently incorrect, as they often involve “looking backwards” in time to understand how 
past advantages and disadvantages impact equality of opportunity  (EOO 376). Chambers also argues that 
egalitarian theories related to the equalization of opportunity are involved in “tracing back the source of 
an individual’s advantage through their educational, family, and even genetic history” (EOO 376). 
Chambers believes the problematic timeframe originated with John Rawls’s concept of the equalization of 
                                                          
44 Claire Chambers’ essay will be cited as follows: EOO refers to Each Outcome is Another Opportunity: Problems with the 
Moment of Equal Opportunity (New York: Sage Publications, 2009). 
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opportunity, i.e. “fairness depends on underlying social conditions, such as fair opportunity, extending 
backwards in time” (EOO 376). Chambers argues that the concept of a life divided in half by an MEO 
fails to adequately address past events that negate equality of opportunity not only the past but in the 
future as well (EOO 377).  
 On Chambers view, dividing up equality of opportunity in society constitutes separating an 
individual’s life into two “halves” that are interrupted by the “Moment of Equal Opportunity” (EOO 
377).45 The first half of an individual’s life contains events that happen to the person that can be 
considered to “unjustly make her different from her peers” (EOO 377). For example, as a fetus, she is 
composed of particular sets of genes, which then translate into “particular propensities for talents” 
(EOO 377).   
 
 
Next, the individual is; 
Unfairly subjected to the influence of her parents, who add unjustly varying degrees of advantage 
to her genetic endowments according to their inclination for, and skill at, such activities as 
reading bedtime stories, playing Mozart in the home, taking her to Shakespeare plays, and asking 
her to count and name various everyday objects (EOO 377).    
 In addition, the educational atmosphere “which may be unfairly determined by the resources of 
her parents,” also contributes to the development of unfair advantages or disadvantages which will 
manifest at some point in her lifetime (EOO 377).46 Chambers notes that the cycle of benefits and harms 
to the individual are of a repetitive nature, so that the attainment of different positions in other institutions 
shifts as a result of past experiences that contain some unfair components (EOO 377). However, at some 
                                                          
45 “The Moment Of Equal Opportunity” will be referred to as the MEO (EOO 377).  
 
46 Lafollette’s claims also address the setback of interests which occur as a result of child abuse and neglect within the family, 
along with concerns as to the financial resources provided by potential parents (LP187). 
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point, equality of opportunity can be said to take place within the process (EOO 378). One such example 
of the “Moment of Equal Opportunity” is the much-deliberated college admissions process (EOO 378). 
Many argue that the unfair advantages and disadvantages contained within the young lives of college 
applicants should be addressed within the college admissions process by those making the admissions 
decisions (EOO 378). On this view, an individual who attends public school should not be judged as 
harshly as one hailing from an elite private institution (EOO 378). Chambers argues that beyond the 
initial “Moment of Equal Opportunity” the lives of individuals continue to develop at a different pace 
(EOO 378). Thus, the advantages and disadvantages individuals face in the first half of life before the 
“Moment of Equal Opportunity” continues to impact their lives far beyond the interference provide by the 
MEO (EOO 378).47 
 Chambers is quick to note that the primary issue does not reside in the way lives are split into two 
halves, one portion being life before the MEO and one portion being life after the MEO (EOO 378). 
Rather, the issue pertains to one’s acceptance of the division of an individual’s life into events that occur 
before any sort of intervention occurs to compensate for advantages or disadvantages, and events which 
occur after the MEO (EOO 378). Chambers believes that dividing an individual’s experiences up in this 
manner contains a problematic assumption as to when attempts to compensate for previous advantages 
and disadvantages within the individuals life should cease (EOO 378).  
Thus, we must ask ourselves whether or not the progression of an individual’s life and the final 
outcomes resulting from the MEO are consistent with both justice and equality of opportunity (EOO 378). 
Chambers argues that one might view the results emanating from the interference of a MEO as effective 
based on, “the version of equality of opportunity one employs and whether one endorses a Moment of 
Equal Opportunity” (EOO 378). Next, Chambers advocates for acts that would continuously equalize 
opportunity throughout an individual’s life (EOO 378).  However, Chambers also notes that the methods 
                                                          
47 The “Moment of Equal Opportunity” will be referred to as the MEO per the Chambers’ abbreviation (EOO 377). 
43 
 
to accomplish such a goal might prove to be problematic, particularly in terms of the epistemological 
concerns and efficiency issues (EOO 378).  
 On my view, the normative means by which equality of opportunity is accomplished matches the 
account given by Chambers (EOO 374-400). Chambers believes that the typical manner in which to 
achieve equalization of opportunity consists of the use of “non-discrimination” techniques and 
opportunities known as “careers open to talents” (EOO 378). However, Chambers argues that most liberal 
egalitarian theories of equality of opportunity advocate for a “more extensive, more egalitarian” approach 
towards achieving equality of opportunity within an individual’s life than the aforementioned policies 
(EOO 378). On Chambers view, more extensive equality of opportunity theories are incompatible with 
the increased inequalities that manifest throughout an individual’s life based on previous advantages and 
disadvantages (EOO 378). The question remains as to whether the division of an individual’s life into 
time before the MEO occurs and the time, after the MEO occurs, is justified within liberal egalitarian 
theories of equality of opportunity (EOO 382).  
I would argue that Lafollette’s approach to minimizing the harms to children during childhood 
addresses the primary concerns raised within Chambers’ assessment of the methods used to achieve 
equalization of opportunity in society (EOO 382). In essence, Lafollette’s parental licensing proposal 
negates the value currently placed on the equalization of opportunity after inequalities have already 
pervaded the individual’s life (LP 185). On Lafollette’s view, children who face maltreatment during 
childhood carry the psychological scars of their abuse throughout their lives (LP 185). Individuals who 
have been abused are statically more likely to become abusers themselves, or to face a barrage of 
psychological and physical issues as a result of being harmed during their formative years (LP 185).  
Arguably, individuals who have endured child abuse and neglect suffer from disadvantages that 
those who are not abused during childhood do not (LP 185). Furthermore, according to the harm principle 
child abuse sets back the child’s interest not to be harmed; thus interference is permissible (T 185). 
Children cannot consent to be born to a particular set of parents, nor a certain set of circumstances; thus 
we inevitably have children living in different home environments, who are subjected to various 
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advantages and disadvantages (EOO 376). In order to resolve the resulting inequalities, one must consider 
interference in the form of an MEO (EOO 376). I will argue that one solution to the “division of life” 
problem contained within most of the well-known liberal egalitarian equality of opportunity theories can 
be found in a Rawlsian approach to fair equality of opportunity (EOO 385). In addition, I will 
demonstrate how the use of a Rawlsian approach falls directly in line with Lafollette’s theoretical 
justifications for parental licensing (EOO 385). Furthermore, I will show that a Rawlsian approach to 
equality of opportunity (in conjunction with a parental licensing program) provides an ample foundation 
by which to promote justice amongst individuals living in our society (EOO 385).  
 An MEO is a strategic method of interference in the lives of individuals which contains two 
initial stages of equal opportunity, “non-discrimination and unembellished careers open to talents”  
(EOO 385). However on a Rawlsian view, such measures can be seen as “insufficiently egalitarian;” due 
to the fact that the scope of interference does not provide the amount of interference necessary to 
counteract previous advantages and disadvantages within an individual’s life (EOO 385).  
 
 
Thus, Rawls introduces a concept known as “fair equality of opportunity,” which can be defined as a 
method intended to:  
Correct the defects of formal equality of opportunity – careers open to talents – in the system of 
natural liberty, so-called. To this end, fair equality of opportunity is said to require not merely 
that public offices and social positions be open in the formal sense, but that all have a fair chance 
to attain them. To specify the idea of a fair chance we say: supposing that there is a distribution of 
native endowments, those who have the same level of talent and ability and the willingness to use 
these gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin, the 
class into which they are born and develop until the age of reason. In all parts of society there are 
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to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and 
endowed (JF 43-44).48 
The Rawlsian concept of fair equality of opportunity is also predicated upon a particular moment 
of an individual’s life, namely the time before the person reaches the “age of reason” (EOO 386). The 
“age of reason” can be considered the age of maturity at which an individual can be considered an 
autonomous individual capable of making choices based on personal experience, preference, and reason.49 
Rawls argues that the class an individual is born into impacts the person’s life far beyond birth (EOO 
386). Thus, Rawls’s claim supports the view that one’s potential success within the various institutions in 
society should not depend on class one is born and raised in before the “age of reason” (EOO 386).  
Herein lies the intersection between the Rawlsian concept of “fair equality of opportunity” and 
the motivation behind Lafollette’s theoretical justifications for the implementation parental licensing 
(EOO 385). Both Rawls and Lafollette are concerned with how individuals might obtain a fair chance to 
attain certain positions in life despite the social class and environment the person is born into and raised 
within (EOO 386). In addition, both Rawls and Lafollette are suspicious of the inequality contained 
within the family unit (EOO 386). Moreover, Rawls addresses the conflict between the family and the 
equalization of opportunity within the discussion of fair equality of opportunity noting,  
Even in a well-ordered society that satisfies the two principles of justice, the family may be a 
second barrier to equal chances between individuals. For as I have defined it, the second principle 
only requires equal life prospects in all sectors of society for those similarly endowed and 
motivated. If there are variations among families in the same sector in how they shape the child’s 
                                                          
48 John Rawls essay Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical is referred to as follows: JF (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1985). 
 
49 Within my discussion of the Rawlsian conception of the components of equality of opportunity, I believe the “age of reason” to 
be twenty-five years of age (AC). I consider the choice to be one that is objective in nature, as it hinges on empirical evidence 
contained in the Sharon Biggs article entitled, A Child's Brain Fully Develops by Age 25 henceforth to abbreviated as follows: 
AC (Colorado: The Examiner, 2009). Biggs’ article offers scientific evidence indicating that the development of brain areas 
considered to be critical to one’s ability to reason ends at twenty-five years of age (AC). Before the age of twenty-five individuals 
exhibit “coincidental decision-making skills, use of appropriate judgment, rational thinking, integration of emotion & critical 
thinking, ability to think clearly about long-term outcomes that stem from behaviors, [and] global thinking vs. self-centered 
thinking” (AC).  
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aspirations, then while fair equality of opportunity may obtain between sectors, equal chances 
between individuals will not. This possibility raises the question as to how far the notion of 
equality of opportunity can be carried (PLC 273).50 
Rawls is correct to view the family as a contributing factor in the discussion of the disadvantages 
and advantages that create unequal access to opportunities throughout an individual’s existence  
(PLC 273). But we must also wonder what Rawls might consider to be “fair access” to attain positions in 
a society which lead towards the realization of “fair equality of opportunity” (JF 43-44). How can one 
ascertain which home environments allow individuals to achieve equitable access to the development of 
the skills necessary to compete within society once maturity is reached? (EOO 376). 
Prima facie, one might be tempted to call such considerations subjective in nature (T 114). After 
all, different families have different social practices, and various dynamics in play which make it virtually 
impossible to create a standard prototype of the type of family unit that could promote fair access to the 
development of skills one must possess alongside others in adulthood (EOO 377). However, I would 
disagree with the stance that families constitute the type of unit whereby the prediction of potential 
outcomes is impossible or impractical (T 114). Furthermore, I believe that the primary motivation of 
Lafollette’s theoretical justification of parental licensing, the limiting of harms to children resulting from 
the act of parenting, provides an objective and efficient manner in which the productivity of the family 
unit can be measured (LP 185). Moving forward, I will address the ways in which Lafollette’s theoretical 
justification of parental licensing resolves Rawls’s concerns regarding the inequalities resulting from 
individuals being raised within different families (PLC 273).  
VIII. The Evolution of a Theory: Creating Public Policy 
 One way in which we can predict the outcomes of child rearing activities comes from the 
acknowledgement of the adverse results harmful acts such as child abuse and neglect produce in those 
individuals subjected to such harms (LP 185). One need only consider the statistical data indicating the 
                                                          
50 Ron Mallen’s essay, Political Liberalism, Cultural Membership, and the Family will be abbreviated as follows: PMF 
 (Florida, Social Theory and Practice, 1999). 
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increased risk of involvement in criminal activities and violent acts those individuals who are subjected to 
child maltreatment and neglect demonstrate to recognize the outcomes created by negative family 
environments (UCM 1).51 Arguably, different empirical studies reveal different methodologies and 
different results as to the extent of the correlation between child maltreatment and a propensity to engage 
in violent crimes (UCM 1). Although there are numerous factors that might contribute to an individual’s 
future involvement in criminal activities, it has become evident from the consideration of juvenile crime 
statistics and child victimization cases that increased instances of criminal participation exists for 
individuals who have undergone some form of child abuse or neglect (UCM 2). Thus, although we might 
concede that successful parenting has the potential to manifest itself in a multitude of ways, we can most 
certainly create the guidelines as to impede the types of parenting which results in adverse outcomes  
(LP 190).  
Satisfying the Rawlsian concerns as to the inequalities created within the family can be addressed 
through careful consideration of the types of actions which might negatively impact a child’s ability to 
achieve fair equality of opportunity upon reaching maturity (EOO 386). Once we ascertain which types of 
parental actions limit access to fair equality of opportunity within the family unit, we can then create the 
guidelines as to the types of acts considered to be impermissible (LP 190). On Lafollette’s view, those 
who object to parental licensing, citing the impracticality of the search for the “criteria of a good parent” 
fail to understand the goals of the licensing policy (LP 190). The primary function of a parental licensing 
program is to exclude individuals who are considered to be inadequate parents from raising children  
(LP 190). Lafollette believes the theoretical justification of licensing to be a regulatory scheme which can 
be “efficiently and justly implemented,” as the implementation rests solely upon objective measures of 
parenting outcomes, as opposed to merely arbitrary assessments of what constitutes a  “good parent” 
                                                          
51 The Cathy Spatz Widom essay entitled, Understanding Child Maltreatment and Juvenile Delinquency: The Research will be 
abbreviated as follows: UCM (Washington, D.C: U.S. Dept. of Justice, 2010). 
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(LP 190).52  
Another objection to the use of a parental licensing policy as a tool to elicit fair equality of 
opportunity lies in the reliability of the methodologies contained within the licensing program (LP 190). 
Rawls’ concerns regarding the inequalities created within the family are adequately addressed only if the 
restrictions placed upon the family as a result of the parental licensing program can provide an accurate 
measurement of those individuals who have the potential to restrict a child’s access to fair equality of 
opportunity (EOO 386). The purpose of the licensing of parents entails various components, all aimed at 
ensuring that children are raised in an environment that does not subject them to undue harm (LP 190). 
However, the method by which such goals are achieved must be just (LP 190). Lafollette gives serious 
consideration to the difficulties involved in the creation of tests that might accurately predict which 
individuals who wish to become parents have a greater risk of exposing their children to harm (LP 191).  
It is important to note that Rawls considered the family to be problematic due to the varied nature 
of different family units, as children are exposed to varying degrees of “unjust influences” (EOO 386). 
Thus, Lafollette’s consideration of the measures taken to predict which parents might pose greater harms 
to children in the home environment also addresses Rawls’ concern as to the manifestation of “unjust 
influences” over a child’s potential abilities in the family (EOO 386). Furthermore, Lafollette’s desire to 
incorporate data from longitudinal studies of prospective parents into a standardized parental licensing 
test showcases a commitment to ensuring the just implementation of practices aimed at negating a child’s 
exposure to an environment which might prove to limit fair equality of opportunity (LP 191). On 
Lafollette’s view, the possibility of a just parental licensing test remains intact, so long as resources 
currently used to isolate characteristics such as the tendency to resort to violence, an inability to manage 
one’s frustrations, or high level of self-centered behaviors are contained within the test (LP 191). Thus, 
                                                          
52 Lafollette notes that he might be in favor of licensing good parents if a plausible way to assess what qualities a “potential 
parent” might possess in order to be considered as a good parent were to be developed, although he also indicates that he has not 
given much consideration to such a proposal (LP 190).  
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concerns as to the current existence of a parental licensing test do not negate the legitimacy of creating a 
licensing program (LP 192).  
The implementation of a parental licensing program also requires the creation of policies that 
address whom might be qualified to administer the test required of all potential parents (LP 192). The 
issue of how to best achieve compliance from individuals designated as authority figures, as well as those 
individuals living under said regulations, remains a common problem within the creation of various 
institutions in society (LP 192). As we consider the creation of institutions to limit barricades to fair 
equality of opportunity within the family, we must also consider the manner in which those who enforce 
said institutions might abuse the newly formed systems, thus impacting the end result of well-intentioned 
programs (LP 192). In essence, the creation of new systems (such as parental licenses), aimed at 
achieving equality of opportunity within society might contain negative externalities including the 
potential for  creating harms due to misuse of testing protocols (LP 192).  
On Lafollette’s view, there will be mistakes made during the administering of the parental 
licensing test (LP 192). However, Lafollette is quick to note that the potential for mistakes to be made 
exists within any procedure administered by autonomous individuals (LP 192). Lafollette argues that the 
harms resulting from child abuse and maltreatment are far worse than the potential harms that might result 
from the denial of a parenting license to an individual (LP 192). In addition, any parental licensing 
program would also contain an appeals process (similar to other licensing programs) along with numerous 
opportunities to take the test, so that individuals might have an opportunity to circumnavigate any 
intentional abuse stemming from the test administrators (LP 193).  
Arguably, all licensing programs are skewed in some way (LP 192). Human beings have a 
tendency to allow unfounded assumptions about the social status, trustworthiness, and potential of others 
to taint their perceptions, for better or for worse (LP 192). Although one might wonder about the biases 
administrators have, we cannot simply dissolve all forms of regulation due to the preferences  individuals 
hold (LP 193). A successful licensing program would simply hold those individuals within certain 
administrative positions to a higher standard of scrutiny, due to the seriousness of the position (LP 193).  
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 If Lafollette’s theoretical justifications for parental licensing are to become a potential tool by 
which to aid Rawlsian fair equality of opportunity, we must also consider objections as to the reasonable 
and just enforcement of the parental licensing program (LP 193). Let us assume that a comprehensive and 
reliable method to test potential parents exists (LP 193). The question remains as to how one might deal 
with individuals who violate the parental licensing requirements and conceive a child (LP 193). Two 
issues present themselves as a result of non-compliance (LP 193). First, we must consider whether or not 
parents who defy the regulation should be subjected to penalties enforced by the law (LP 193). Next we 
must ascertain the fate of the children born as a result of violations of the parental licensing policy 
(LP 193).53  
Consider the number of individuals who are arraigned each year on charges of practicing 
medicine without a medical license (LPR 328). Despite the severe consequences associated with violating 
the laws associated with the offense, each year numerous individuals are arraigned on charges of 
practicing medicine without a license (LPR 184). However, a reasonable person would never call for the 
end of the medical licensing program due to the actions of potential violators (LP 183). In fact, we can see 
the benefits of continuing to uphold the strict regulations in the field of medicine as a result of the harms 
that  occur at the hands of unlicensed practitioners (LPR 327). Arguably, a parental licensing program 
would be no different, particularly in terms of the viability of the program (LP 193). On Lafollette’s view, 
the existence of potential violators does not necessitate an insurmountable problem (LP 193). Lafollette 
argues that the seriousness of the task at hand (i.e. protecting children from being abused by their parents) 
strengthens the demand for the development of a “reasonable enforcement procedure” (LP 193). Thus, 
even if uncertainties exist as to the manner in which the parental licensing program might be enforced, 
one can remain committed to the implementation of the licensing proposal (LP 193).  
Thus far, I have demonstrated how Lafollette’s theoretical justifications of a licensing program 
are compatible with the Rawlsian concerns as to how individuals might achieve fair equality of 
                                                          
53 Lafollette notes that issues of non-compliance exist within all professions and activities requiring licensing (LP 193). 
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opportunity in spite of the inequalities contained within different families (EOO 387). Fostering a theory 
of justice which addresses the differences individuals face in regards to life prospects is essential for both 
Rawls and Lafollette (EOO 387). In addition, both viewpoints suggest  respect for the moral status of 
children, despite a child’s immaturity and inability to contribute in the same manner as adults living 
within a given society (LPR 340). However, questions remain as to the practicality of the implementation 
of a parental licensing program (LPR 336).  
Lafollette argues that one can justify the constraints of a licensing proposal if the following 
criteria are met: “(a) if we can specify criteria for a competent parent, (b) if we have moderately accurate 
methods for determining competence, and (c) if there are no special reasons for thinking that the 
program’s cost exceed its benefits” (LPR 336). I have noted the points of contention surrounding 
Lafollette’s theoretical parental licensing proposal and deemed them to be remarkably similar to the 
issues all licensing programs initially face (LP 183). Moving forward, I will consider Lafollette’s proposal 
which calls for the implementation of a “limited licensing program” thereby transforming the theoretical 
justification of a parental licensing program into a viable public policy aimed at regulating parents     
(LPR 338).  
Within the defense of a parental licensing program, Lafollette outlines the various components 
that are necessary for the creation and implementation of a “limited licensing program” (LPR 338). 
Lafollette’s ideas for the limited licensing program are predicated on setting specific defaults within 
society, whereby those who meet minimal requirements for a parental license might be rewarded for their 
compliance, as opposed to being punished for failing to meet the licensing requirements (LPR 338). In 
essence, Lafollette’s reward system would entice individuals who wish to become parents to seek out the 
parental license (LPR 338). In addition, slower implementation might be perceived as less intrusive than 
the full scale rollout of a parental licensing program (LPR 338).  
One example given by Lafollette pertains to the types of strategies employed by insurance 
companies who wish to encourage teenagers to seek out driver’s education courses (LPR 339). As a part 
of promotions aimed at securing new insurance policy customers, insurance companies offer teenagers 
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who complete the driver’s education courses discounts on car insurance (LPR 339). On Lafollette’s view, 
prospective parents might be enticed to participate in a parental licensing program in the same way, 
particularly if tax breaks are used to incentivize participation in the parental licensing program (LPR 339). 
Lafollette’s consideration of tax breaks as a means by which individuals might be incentivized to 
participate in the parental licensing program appears to be a smart and relatively simple way to encourage 
participation in a parental licensing program (LPR 339).  
Consider the current tax breaks offered to individuals who are married, or those who have 
children, or even those who own property in our country (LPR 339). The United States government 
incentivizes particular institutions, such as the institution of marriage (LPR 339). The government also 
offers benefits to those who wish to start a family (thus taking on the responsibility of raising children) 
with tax credits each year (LPR 339). Using the same principles to motivate individuals to participate in 
the parental licensing program would be a viable and smart way to introduce radical change into the 
normative parenting model (LPR 339). Insofar as our society remains based upon the principles of 
capitalism, awarding monetary benefits for those who chose to participate in a parental licensing program 
would arguably be a success (LPR 339). Furthermore, the tax breaks would also help to bolster the 
financial stability of potential parents (LPR 339).  
Concerns may be raised as to the impact such benefits might have on compliance within varying 
socioeconomic groups within society (LPR 339). After all, the wealthy would most likely feel less 
inclined to participate in the licensing program, as the tax breaks would be less enticing for those in their 
tax bracket (LPR 339). However, I would argue that one need only look at the response of the wealthy in 
previous matters concerning tax breaks (and potential tax increases on the rich) to understand that tax 
breaks are just as appealing to those who are considered to be a part of the higher tax brackets as they are 
to those in the lower tax brackets (LPR 339). The motivations to receive tax breaks remain high for both 
groups, despite the varying levels of financial stability (LPR 339). Furthermore, offering tax breaks would 
allow for a more cost-effective and unobtrusive start to the implementation of the parental licensing 
program (LPR 339). Arguably, a vast number of institutions in our society favor the wealthy, thus the 
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implementation of tax breaks provides a mechanism by which individuals from a variety of 
socioeconomic backgrounds can benefit financially and improve their financial standing each year     
(LPR 339).  
Next we must consider the various components of the parental licensing program (LPR 339). On 
Lafollette’s view, the licensing program would consist of either stand-alone parenting courses or courses 
that would be offered in high school to individuals who might be interested in becoming parents one day 
(LPR 339). Those who complete the parenting courses would then meet the requirements to receive a 
parental license (PLR 339). Lafollette argues that a rigorous parenting course would ensure that 
individuals do not possess traits that may increase the risk of harms to children while simultaneously 
strengthening the “vital knowledge” parents need in order to adequately provide for a child’s needs  
(LPR 339). This claim rests on statistical evidence which indicates that a large number of parents do not 
possess basic knowledge about the developmental needs of children (LPR 339).54 A lack of knowledge as 
to the various stages of child development limits one’s ability to pursue the types of interactions 
necessitated by the child’s mental and physical needs, thus amplifying frustrations and potentially raising 
the likelihood of abuse or neglect in the home (LPR 339). On Lafollette’s view, providing individuals 
with classroom instruction on the symptoms and treatment of childhood illnesses, the stages of cognitive 
development, and even childhood nutrition can also help to mitigate the frustrations some new parents 
may feel (LPR 339).  
Another important component of Lafollette’s limited licensing program concerns assisting (and 
simultaneously monitoring) new parents during the first few years of a child’s life (LPR 339). Lafollette’s 
inspiration for this additional component stems from the “UK Health Visitor’s Program” (LPR 339).55 
The program assigns an in-home nurse to every family living in the UK with a child who is under the age 
                                                          
54 Lafollette cites a study contained within the 2008 Pediatrics Academy Society Publication which indicated that one-third of 
parents lack “basic knowledge of child-care and development” (LPR 339). 
 
55 Information on the “UK Health Visitor’s Program” can be found in the following publication: Department of Health, Facing 
the Future: A Review of the Role of Health Visitors (London: Crown Copyright, 2007).  
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of five (LPR 339). According to Lafollette, “the nurse is available for home visits to examine and care for 
the child, and to offer advice on nutrition, parenting, development, etc.” (LPR 339). The goal of providing 
such a service to new parents ensures that the parents feel supported and better prepared to handle the new 
responsibility of raising a child (LPR 339).  
In addition, the nurse can serve as the second component of the parental licensing program, thus 
ensuring that instances of potential maltreatment of children will be addressed as soon as possible, rather 
than later on in the child’s life (LPR 339). Lafollette notes the importance of early intervention in cases of 
child abuse and neglect, as nearly half of all instances of child maltreatment takes place before the child 
reaches four years of age (LPR 339).56 The services provided by the nurse can serve as an additional 
checkpoint in the parental licensing program, while also offering an additional resource to new parents 
who will find the nurse to be a beneficial “perk” associated with the licensing program (LPR 339). The 
aforementioned procedures encourage the development of good practices within the new parents, thus 
fostering a nurturing environment where the interests of the child are at the forefront of adult actions, 
rather than assuming that parents inherently possess the skills and knowledge needed to raise children 
(LPR 339).  
Next, Lafollette pinpoints another issue with the parenting classes contained in the parental 
licensing program requirements (LPR 339).  One cannot guarantee that the parenting courses will give an 
adequate indication of whether or not an individual possess the “abilities, judgment, and disposition” 
necessary to raise a child devoid of any maltreatment (LPR 339). Thus, the validity of the parenting 
courses appears to be subjective at best (LPR 339). However, Lafollette argues that if the courses aim to 
enhance the judgment and skill-set of the individual, such worries are of no consequence to the 
effectiveness of the licensing program (LPR 339). Although a test may not exist which can provide 
definitive proof of whether an individual holds such traits, there are ways in which one can measure the 
                                                          
56 Lafollette’s statistical data regarding instances of child maltreatment and the ages of occurrences of child abuse and neglect can 
be found in the US Department of Health and Human Services (op. Cit., Table 3.3). 
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complete lack of the traits which nurturing individual’s possess (LPR 339).57 If one can show that an 
individual lacks certain personality traits and abilities, one can then ascertain the level of risks the person 
may pose to children (LPR 339).  
Lafollette also briefly mentions the existence of the “Child Abuse Potential Inventory” test, a 
clinical psychological exam that measures various factors in order to ascertain whether an individual 
might possess the character traits and propensity to (LPR 337). The CAP Inventory consists of a 160 
question inventory of the following:  
The CAP Inventory (Form VI; Milner, 1986) is a 160-item, paper and pencil questionnaire that 
was originally designed to provide an estimate of parental risk in suspected cases of child 
physical abuse. The CAP Inventory (CAPI) is now used as a risk screening tool in a variety of 
assessment situations. It has a third-grade reading level and respondents are instructed to respond 
to each item by indicating whether they agree or disagree with the item statement. The 160-item 
CAP Inventory (CAPI) contains a 77-item child physical abuse scale and six factor scales: 
distress, rigidity, unhappiness, problems with child and self, problems with family, and problems 
from others. In addition, subsets of the 160 questionnaire items have been used to develop two 
"special" scales: the ego-strength scale and the loneliness scale. There are also three scales 
designed to detect response distortions (a lie scale, a random response scale, and an inconsistency 
scale) which in different pairs form three validity indexes: the faking-good index, the faking-bad 
index, and random response index. If any validity index is elevated, the abuse score may not be 
an accurate representation of the respondent's "true" abuse score (PM 10).58 
 A variety of similar tests are currently in use by social workers throughout the country, all of 
which are designed to quantify an individual’s propensity to demonstrate varying levels of abusive or 
                                                          
57 Lafollette mentions the “Child Abuse Potential Inventory” test as a potential prototype of the manner of testing that would take 
place during the initial assessment of a potential parent’s ability to provide a child with an environment free from abuse or 
neglect (LPR 337).  
 
58 The Harsh Parenting Measurement Study compiled for the Los Angeles Children and Families Commission will be referred to 
as follows: PM (California: Harder + Company Community Research, 2012).  
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neglectful behaviors (LPR 337). Thus, concerns as to the development and reliability of parenting tests 
can be satisfied through the careful assessment of the existing clinical studies in order to ascertain which 
methods might provide the most definitive predictors of an individual’s propensity to engage in acts of 
child abuse or neglect (LPR 337). In addition, as the parental licensing program becomes integrated into 
society, the number of individuals who wish to participate will grow, thus yielding even more data that 
will continuously refine the effectiveness of the licensing tests (LPR 337). Eventually, the test results will 
illustrate an extremely robust understanding of the traits of individuals who pose greater risks to children, 
limiting the fears of the existence of “false-positives” in the licensing program examination (LPR 337).  
Lafollette also suggests that the parenting courses include a “self-graded personality inventory” 
for students (LPR 339). The instructor of the class would go over the results, in order to explain the 
impact of certain personality traits to potential parents (LPR 339). Ideally, isolating the personality traits 
that indicate a higher propensity for violent behaviors gives individuals a wealth of knowledge about their 
potential shortcomings as a caregiver before a child is born (LPR 339). Thus, individuals would have yet 
another chance to rectify problematic personality traits before attempting to pass the parental licensing 
tests (LPR 339). At every step in the process, Lafollette purposefully builds in extra considerations of the 
skills needed to raise a child, while also offering additional services to those individuals who do not yet 
possess the tools needed to mitigate the risks associated with parenting (LPR 339). The underlying 
principle of Lafollette’s parental licensing framework continues to be the protection of the health and 
welfare of children, as their moral status is considered to be equally as important as that of adults 
(LPR 340). 
The final component of Lafollette’s licensing program concerns bolstering the existing safety nets 
within our society in order to lessen the stressors new parents may face (LPR 340). Lafollette argues that 
the combination of economic, social, and personal issues may cause parents to abuse or neglect their 
children (LPR 339-340). Lafollette argues that additional protections for children are created indirectly, as 
a result of “strengthening public education, expanding health care, and bolstering children’s services” 
(LPR 339). Thus, reinforcing social safety nets provides an additional step aimed at the protection of 
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children in order to limit the potential risk of harm imposed upon children by their parents (LPR 39). On 
Lafollette’s view, if the varying degrees of interference with the family fail to prevent harms to children, 
adjustments to the parental licensing program are permissible, including the potential implementation of 
more “robust” licensing programs (LPR 340). However, the goal of the limited licensing program is not 
to experiment with parental interference, but to offer a parental licensing program that prevents harms to 
children while simultaneously garnering the support of potential parents (LPR 340).  
IX. Conclusion: The Actualization of A Theory 
In the consideration of Lafollette’s parental licensing proposal, one primary objection remains 
independent of the aforementioned concerns regarding implementation and compliance, (LPR 340). On 
Lafollette’s view, those who emphatically reject to the concept of parental licensing do so as a result of 
the lack of consideration the theory places upon a parent’s “natural dominion” over children (LPR 340). 
At the outset of his second essay on parental licensing, Lafollette noted that English common law served 
as the foundation for most laws within the United States, despite the fact that English law promoted the 
belief in “parental sovereignty” (LPR 340). In addition, it is important to consider the fact that English 
common law considered children to be the property of their fathers (LPR 340). Although Western 
civilization no longer supports this view of a father’s dominion over his children, Lafollette argues that 
our normative views (as to the status of children within the family) remain hinged to the original concept 
of a child’s inferior status (LPR 340). Lafollette’s original paper addressed the issue of parental authority 
and subsequent attitudes towards children in the concept of “natural dominion”: 
[P]arents legitimately exercise extensive and virtually unlimited control over their children. 
Others can properly interfere with or criticize parental decisions only in unusual and tightly 
prescribed circumstances – for example, when parents severely and repeatedly abuse their 
children. In all other cases, the parents reign supreme (LP 196).  
Herein we can see the underlying problem as to the prevalence of policies aimed at the 
continuation of parental sovereignty, despite the potentially detrimental consequences of child abuse and 
neglect (LPR 340). The reluctance to forgo the antiquated concept of parental sovereignty results in a 
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perpetual cycle whereby adults are given the ability to retain unconscionable amounts of power over the 
lives of their children (LPR 340). Allowing parents’ unrestricted access to the manner in which the future 
autonomous individuals of our society (i.e. children) are treated is problematic at best, as we must then 
attempt to ascertain whether or not individuals were subjected to child abuse and neglect (LPR 340). 
Eliminating the belief that parents within our society hold “natural dominion” over their child will 
mitigate the manner in which the moral standing of children is continuously violated (TM 332).  
I have shown how Lafollette’s theoretical justification of parental licensing is predicated on the 
same considerations as those contained within the harm principle (T 65). In addition, I have illustrated 
how the interference justified by the harm principle (as a result of potential harms committed against 
children), intersects with the belief that children hold an equal moral status with other human beings 
(TM 3). As children are considered to be persons, and all persons are entitled to receive equal moral 
consideration, we can no longer disregard the moral standing of children (TM 3). If children are no longer 
considered to hold inferior moral statuses, we must then consider what justice requires if we desire to 
preserve the moral standing of children living in our society (TM 3). 
In order to address considerations of just principles within society, I explored the Rawlsian 
concept of fair equality of opportunity which illustrates the problems associated with the time-based 
interference known as a “Moment of Equal Opportunity” (EOO 385). Both Lafollette and Rawls stress the 
existence of inequalities within the family structure, particularly in terms of the potential advantages and 
disadvantages individuals incur during childhood (LP 273). If we value access to fair equality of 
opportunity for every individual in our society, we must create institutions that circumnavigate the 
advantages and disadvantages individuals incur as a result of their upbringing (EOO 386).  
Hugh Lafollette details one particular way in which equality of opportunity can be achieved 
without the dissolution of the family, namely the establishment of a parental licensing program (LP 182). 
Within the theoretical justifications of parental licensing, Lafollette demonstrates the existence of the 
same rationale that  underlies the licensing restrictions of various professions (LPR 328). Arguably, 
parenting is an activity that poses a significant risk to a large demographic of individuals who are not 
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capable of giving their consent (LPR 331). As children are one of the most vulnerable groups within our 
society, we must ascertain how to protect them from the mental and physical harms that may occur at the 
hands of their caregivers (LPR 331). Establishing an objective, child-centered, and parent-guided manner 
in which children can be raised calls for the consideration of new methodologies that will finally cast 
aside the normative view of a parent’s “natural dominion” over their child (LPR 340).  
Acknowledging the vulnerability of children and the equal moral considerations they are to be 
given, “merely in virtue of being a person” requires a reevaluation of previously held views on parent-
child relationships within our society (LPR 341). We cannot ensure that every single child will have 
parents who love and support them (LPR 341). We also cannot guarantee that every single child will be 
born into a wealthy family, or have an opportunity to attend an Ivy League school. However, as the 
gatekeepers for the next generation, we are justified in trying our absolute best to protect children from 
harms predicated on antiquated conceptions of parental authority (LPR 341). Rather than allowing 
children to become victims at the hands of their caregivers, we must reevaluate the moral standing of 
children and the way in which we have come to view the normative parent-child relationships in the 
family (LPR 341). A parental licensing program does not call for the end of autonomy in the family, but 
rather an end to the ability to cause psychological and physical harm to children during their formative 
years (LP 182-197).  
Q.E.D. 
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